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Abstract
In two-party computation, two players want to collaborate in a secure way
in order to achieve a common goal, but, they do not trust each other and
do not want the other to learn more than necessary about their inputs.
Unfortunately, two-party computation is impossible to achieve uncondi-
tionally securely, i.e., such that even an adversary with infinite computing
power has no chance in breaking the system. We do have implementa-
tions in the computational setting, i.e., where we assume that the comput-
ing power of the adversary is bounded, but the security of these imple-
mentations are based on unproven assumptions such as the assumption
that factoring is hard.
However, if a very simple primitive called oblivious transfer is available,
then any two party computation can be implemented in an uncondition-
ally secure way. In this thesis we investigate what weaker forms of obliv-
ious transfer still allow for implementing oblivious transfer, and hence
any two-party computation.
First of all, we will show that oblivious transfer is equivalent to a ran-
domized form of oblivious transfer, and that this randomized oblivious
transfer is in fact symmetric. It follows that also oblivious transfer is sym-
metric.
Then, we present a protocol that implements oblivious transfer from a
weakened oblivious transfer called universal oblivious transfer, where one
of the two playersmay get additional information. Our reduction is about
twice as efficient as previous results.
Weak oblivious transfer is an even weaker form of oblivious transfer, where
both players may obtain additional information about the other player’s
v
input, and where the output can contain errors. We give a new, weaker
definition of weak oblivious transfer, as well as new reductions with a
more detailed analysis.
Finally, we show that any protocol that implements oblivious transfer
from weak oblivious transfer can be used in the computational setting to
implement computationally secure oblivious transfer from computational
weak oblivious transfer, which is a computational version of weak oblivious
transfer, where the additional information both players may obtain about
the other player’s input is only computationally bounded.
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Zusammenfassung
Sichere Zweiparteienberechnung erlaubt es zwei Spielern, die einander nicht
vertrauen, gemeinsam eine Berechnung durchzufu¨hren, ohne dass der
jeweils andere Spieler irgendwelche zusa¨tzlichen Informationen u¨ber ihre
Eingabe erfa¨hrt. Leider ist es unmo¨glich eine solche Berechnung so auszu-
fu¨hren, dass sie selbst gegen einen berechenma¨ssig unbeschra¨nkten An-
greifer sicher ist. Unter derAnnahme, dass der Angreifer berechenma¨ssig
beschra¨nkt ist, existieren sichere Protokolle, jedoch basiert die Sicherheit
dieser Protokolle auf zusa¨tzlichen Annahmen, wie zum Beispiel der An-
nahme, dass Faktorisieren schwierig ist.
Wenn jedoch eine Primitive mit dem Namen vergessliche U¨bertragung ge-
geben ist, dann kann jede Zweiparteienberechnung sicher gegen unbe-
schra¨nkte Angreifer ausgefu¨hrt werden. In dieser Arbeit untersuchen
wir, welche schwa¨cheren Formen von vergesslicher U¨bertragung uns im-
mer noch erlauben, eine sichere vergessliche U¨bertragung auszufu¨hren.
Zuerst zeigen wir, dass vergessliche U¨bertragung a¨quivalent ist zu einer
randomisierten vergesslichen U¨bertragung, und dass diese Primitive sym-
metrisch ist. Daraus folgt, dass vergessliche U¨bertragung ebenfalls sym-
metrisch ist.
Universelle vergessliche U¨bertragung ist eine schwa¨chere Variante von ver-
gesslicher U¨bertragung, in welcher einer der beiden Spieler zusa¨tzliche
Informationen erhalten kann. Wir zeigen ein neues, effizienteres Prokoll
um daraus vergessliche U¨bertragung herzustellen.
Schwache vergessliche U¨bertragung ist eine noch schwa¨chere Form von ver-
gesslicher U¨bertragung, in welcher beide Spieler zusa¨tzliche Informa-
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tion erhalten ko¨nnen und die U¨bertragung falsch sein kann. Wir geben
sowohl eine neue, schwa¨chere Definition von schwacher vergesslicher
U¨bertragung, als auch neue Protokolle wieman daraus vergessliche U¨ber-
tragung herstellen kann.
Schliesslich zeigen wir, dass jedes Verfahren, welches vergessliche U¨ber-
tragung aus schwacher vergesslicher U¨bertragung herstellt, auch einge-
setzt werden kann, um berechenma¨ssig sichere vergessliche U¨bertragung
aus berechenma¨ssig schwacher vergesslicher U¨bertragung herzustellen.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
On January 16, 1797, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) sent a let-
ter to the publisher Vieweg with the following content (translated to En-
glish by [MT98]):
”I am inclined to offer Mr. Vieweg from Berlin an epic
poem, Hermann and Dorothea, which will have approxima-
tely 2000 hexameters. [. . . ] Concerning the royalty we will
proceed as follows: I will hand over to Mr. Counsel Bo¨ttiger a
sealed note which contains my demand, and I wait for what
Mr. Vieweg will suggest to offer for my work. If his offer is
lower than my demand, then I take my note back, unopened,
and the negotiation is broken. If, however, his offer is higher,
then I will not ask for more than what is written in the note to
be opened by Mr. Bo¨ttiger.”
The reason for Goethe to choose such a complicated scheme was not to
maximize his profit — he would not have earned less by just selling it
to Vieweg — he wanted to gain information on how much Vieweg was
willing to pay for his work. Indeed, his procedure can be viewed as a sec-
ond price auction, where Goethe himself was playing the second bidder
[MT98]. However, other than in a second price auction, Goethe would get
to know the bid of the highest bidder. To achieve his goal, Goethe needed
to be able to commit to a value that Vieweg would not get to know before
1
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placing his bid, but such that Goethe himself would also not be able to
change it. He did this by giving an envelope to a third, trusted party, Mr.
Bo¨ttiger. Unfortunately, things turned out other than intended by Goethe.
Bo¨ttiger opened the envelope and gave Vieweg a hint, who then bid ex-
actly what Goethe had demanded in his envelope. Vieweg was therefore
able to completely hide the information on how much he was willing to
pay.
This is an example of two-party computation, where two players want to
achieve a common goal, however they do not trust each other and do
not want the other to learn more than necessary about their inputs. Ob-
viously, such a computation can easily be achieved with the help of a
trusted third party. However, as the example above shows, the two play-
ers would rather not need to trust such a third party. Our goal is therefore
to achieve a two-party computation without the help of a trusted third party.
Unfortunately, this task is impossible to achieve unconditionally securely,
i.e., such that even an adversary with infinite computing power has no
chance in breaking the system. On the other hand, there exist implemen-
tations in the computational setting, i.e., they are secure against adver-
saries which only have limited computing power. However, the security
of these implementations are based on unproven assumptions such as
that factoring the product of two large prime numbers is hard.
Needless to say, we would like to base the security of a two-party compu-
tation protocol on as few assumptions as possible. Surprisingly, it turned
out that if a very simple primitive called oblivious transfer is available, then
any two party computation can be implemented in an unconditionally se-
cure way. Oblivious transfer is a primitive that allows a sender to send
two bits to a receiver, who can choose which bits he wants to receive. The
receiver will remain completely ignorant about the other bit, while the
sender does not get to know which bit has been chosen by the receiver.
Even though oblivious transfer is quite simple, it is rather difficult to
implement. For example, in the computational setting quite strong as-
sumptions are needed at the moment. On the other hand, it is possible to
implement oblivious transfer under certain physical assumptions. How-
ever, such systems generally do not achieve a perfect oblivious transfer,
but one where one or both players may still be able to cheat in some way,
and obtain additional information that he should not be allowed.
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The main topic of this thesis is to present different protocols that imple-
ment oblivious transfer from weaker variants. For example, in weak obliv-
ious transfer, there can occur three types of errors: first, even if both play-
ers execute the protocol honestly, the output of the receiver can be wrong
with some probability. Secondly, a dishonest receiver may not remain
completely ignorant about the second input bit. And finally, a dishonest
sender may gain partial information about the receivers choice bit. We
show that if these three errors are not too large, it is possible to imple-
ment an almost perfect oblivious transfer.
1.1 Background
Two- andmulti-party computation. The concept of two- and multi-party
computation was introduced by Yao [Yao82]. A complete solution of this
problem with respect to computational security was given by Goldreich,
Micali, andWigderson [GMW87], and later but independently, by Chaum,
Damga˚rd, and van de Graaf [CDvdG88]. Later Ben-Or, Goldwasser, and
Wigderson [BGW88] and, independently, Chaum, Cre´peau, and Dam-
ga˚rd [CCD88] showed that in a model with only pairwise secure chan-
nels, multi-party computation among n players unconditionally secure
against an active adversary is achievable if and only if t < n/3 players are
corrupted. Beaver [Bea89] and independently Rabin and Ben-Or [RB89]
showed that this bound can be improved to t < n/2, assuming that global
broadcast channels are available.
Security definitions. Intuitively, it seems to be very clear what wemean
when we say that a two-party protocol should be secure: it should be
correct, i.e., it should implement the desired functionality, and it should be
private, meaning that it should not leak additional information to any of
the players. Unfortunately, these intuitive ad-hoc requirements are hard
to formalize and often even insufficient.
Inspired by the work of Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff [GMR85] on
zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge, Goldreich, Micali and Wigderson
[GMW87]were the first to use the simulation paradigm to define the secu-
rity of multi-party computation protocols. Micali and Rogaway [MR92]
and Beaver [Bea92] further formalized this approach. The idea behind
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these definitions is very intuitive and goes as follows. We say that a (real)
protocol securely computes a certain functionality if for any adversary
attacking the protocol, there exists a (not much stronger) adversary in
an ideal setting — where the players only have black-box access to the
functionality they try to implement — that achieves the same. In other
words, a protocol is secure if any attack in the real model can be sim-
ulated in the much more restrictive ideal model. As shown by Beaver
[Bea92], and formally proved by Canetti [Can96, Can00], these security
definitions imply that secure protocols are sequentially composable: if in a
secure protocol that uses an ideal functionality, that ideal functionality
is replaced by a secure protocol, then the composed protocol is again a
secure protocol. Later, Backes, Pfitzmann and Waidner [PW01, BPW03]
and independently Canetti [Can01] introduced a stronger security defini-
tion called universal composability, which guarantees that protocols can be
composed in an arbitrary way.
Oblivious transfer. For the special case of two-party computation, there
cannot exist a protocol that is unconditionally secure against one cor-
rupted player. However, if a primitive called oblivious transfer (OT) is
available, then any two-party computation can be executed uncondition-
ally secure, which was shown by Goldreich and Vainish [GV88] for pas-
sive adversaries, and by Kilian [Kil88] for active adversaries. These re-
sults were later improved by Cre´peau [Cre´90], Goldwasser and Levin
[GL91], and Cre´peau, van de Graaf, and Tapp [CvdGT95]. The idea of
oblivious transfer goes back to Wiesner [Wie83] in around 1970. He tried
to show that quantum physics allows us to achieve certain (classical) tasks
that otherwise would not be possible. Since a quantum state can con-
tain more information than what we can get out by measuring it, he pro-
posed to use quantum communication as “a means for transmitting two
messages either but not both of which may be received.”, which is exactly what
OT achieves. More formally, OT is a primitive that receives two bits x0
and x1 from the sender and a bit c from the receiver, and sends xc to the
receiver, while the receiver does not get to know x1−c, and the sender
does not get to know c. Wiesner proposed a simple protocol that achieves
this, but he pointed out that it could be broken in principle. Rabin [Rab81]
introduced a similar primitive in 1981, and showed its usefulness to cryp-
tographic applications. (He also gave oblivious transfer its name.) Even,
Goldreich and Lempel [EGL85] reintroducedWiesner’s version OT.
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Computationally secure oblivious transfer. There exist different ap-
proaches to securely implement OT, with different degrees of security.
If we are only interested in computational security, i.e., a system that can-
not be broken by any adversary limited to polynomial computing time,
then OT can be implemented using noiseless communication only, given
some assumptions are correct. Of course, we would like to make these
assumptions as weak as possible, for example, we would like to have an
implementation of OT that is secure under the assumption that one-way
functions— functions that are easy to evaluate, but hard to invert — exist.
Unfortunately, such an implementation is still not known. Even worse,
Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] showed that such an implementation, if
it exists, will be very hard to find, because there cannot exist any black-box
reduction of OT to one-way functions.
Even, Goldreich and Lempel [EGL85] presented an implementation of
OT using trapdoor permutations. However, Goldreich [Gol04] showed
that in fact the stronger assumption of an enhanced trapdoor permutations is
needed for the protocol to be secure. This assumptionwas later weakened
by Haitner [Hai04] to dense trapdoor permutations. Other implementations
use more specific assumptions such as the assumption that factoring a
product of two primes is hard, as shown by Rabin [Rab81], or the Diffie-
Hellman assumption, shown by Bellare and Micali, Naor and Pinkas, and
Aiello, Ishai and Reingold [BM90, NP01, AIR01]. Unfortunately, these
latter assumptions have turned out to be wrong in the quantumworld, as
there exists an efficient algorithm for breaking both assumptions, shown
by Shor [Sho94].
In the universally composable framework, Canetti and Fischlin [CF01]
showed that there cannot exist an implementation of OT secure against
active adversaries1. On the other hand, Canetti, Lindell, Ostrovsky, and
Sahai [CLOS02] showed that the protocol presented in [GMW87] is secure
against passive adversaries in the universally composable framework.
Garay, MacKenzie and Yang [GMY04] proposed an implementation of
enhanced committed OT secure against active adversaries under the addi-
tional assumption of a common reference string. Fischlin [Fis06] proposed
a protocol that does not assume a common reference string, but needs the
help of other players.
1They showed that bit-commitment is impossible, but since bit-commitment can be im-
plemented from OT, this implies that also OT is impossible.
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Unconditionally secure oblivious transfer. All known computational
implementations of OT — besides the assumption that the adversary is
computationally bounded — are based on quite strong, unproven as-
sumptions about the complexity of certain problems. Unconditional secu-
rity does not have these shortcomings. It offers a security that cannot be
broken in principle, no matter what computing power the adversary has,
and is generally not based on unproven assumptions. Unfortunately, un-
conditional secure OT is impossible to achieve if the players only have
access to noiseless communication. In fact, even noiseless quantum com-
munication does not help, as has been shown by Mayers [May97], and
independently by Lo and Chau [LC97]2. Therefore, some additional re-
sources must be available in order to achieve unconditionally secure OT.
Reductions between different variants of OT. There exist many differ-
ent variants of OT, and all of them have been shown to be equivalent to
OT. Cre´peau [Cre´88] showed that OT can be implemented from Rabin’s
OT, and Brassard, Cre´peau and Robert [BCR86] showed, among others,
that string OT (where the sender can send strings instead of single bits)
can be implemented from bit OT. More efficient methods to implement
string OT from bit OT were presented by Brassard, Cre´peau and Sa´ntha
[BCS96], by Brassard, Cre´peau andWolf [BC97, BCW03], and by Cre´peau
and Savvides [CS06]. Imai, Morozov, and Nascimento [IMN06] showed
a direct implementation of string OT from Rabin’s OT. Dodis and Micali
[DM99] presented a protocol to extend the number of choices for the re-
ceiver. Another interesting property of OT was shown by Bennett, Bras-
sard, Cre´peau and Skubiszewska [BBCS92] and Beaver [Bea95], namely
that OT can be precomputed. This means that OT can be converted into
a randomized version of OT, that can later be converted back into OT.
Cre´peau and Sa´ntha [CS91], and independently Ostrovsky, Venkatesan
and Yung [OVY93] presented protocols which implement OT in one di-
rection from OT in the other direction. Wolf and Wullschleger [WW06]
presented a much simpler and more efficient protocol for this.
Various weak versions of OT have been proposed where either the sen-
der’s or the receiver’s security is weakened. Cre´peau and Kilian [CK88]
presented an implementation of OT from α-1-2 slightly OT, which is a
weak version of OT where the sender may get some information about
2They showed that bit-commitment is impossible, but since bit-commitment can be im-
plemented from OT, this implies that also OT is impossible.
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the choice bit of the receiver. Brassard, Cre´peau andWolf [BC97, BCW03]
showed that OT can also be implemented from XOT, GOT or UOT with
repetitions, which are weak versions of OT where the receiver may get
information he is not supposed to. Cachin [Cac98] proposed a primi-
tive called Universal OT (without repetitions), which is a generalization
of XOT, GOT or UOT with repetitions. He proposed a protocol to imple-
ment OT, but his proof turned out to be incorrect. The protocol was finally
shown to be secure by Damga˚rd, Fehr, Salvail and Schaffner [DFSS06].
The bound for the protocol were later improved byWullschleger [Wul07].
Damga˚rd, Kilian and Salvail [DKS99] presented an even weaker form of
OT called weak OT (WOT), where the security for both players is weak-
ened and the output to the receiver may be faulty. They presented some
bounds for which OT can be implemented fromWOT. LaterWullschleger
[Wul07] showed that their definition of WOT implicitly uses quite strong
assumptions, and proposed a new, weaker definition together with new
reductions.
OT from physical assumptions. Cre´peau and Kilian [CK88] were the
first to present protocols for OT using noise as additional resource in form
of an erasure channel. Cre´peau [Cre´97] presented a protocol for the binary-
symmetric noisy channel, which was later generalized by Korjik and Mo-
rozov [KM01]. Cre´peau, Morozov and Wolf [CMW04] finally presented
a protocol for any non-trivial channel. As shown by Imai, Mu¨ller-Quade,
Nascimento and Winter, [IMQNW04], Wolf and Wullschleger [WW04],
and Nascimento and Winter [NW06], these results also translate to the
model where the players receive distributed randomness3.
Damga˚rd, Kilian and Salvail [DKS99] introduced a more realistic, unfair
model in which the adversary is given more information than the honest
players. For example, if a noisy channel is implemented using a trans-
mitter and an antenna, an adversary may be able to replace the official
antenna by a larger one, and may, therefore, receive the transmitted sig-
nal with less noise than an honest receiverwould. They presented explicit
bounds for the unfair binary noisy channel, which were later improved by
Damga˚rd, Fehr, Morozov and Salvail [DFMS04, Mor05]. A central part of
these results was the algorithm that implements OT fromWOT.However,
for the reduction to work, the definition of [Wul07] must be used.
3A similar model has already been studied in the context of key agreement by Ahlswede
and Csisza´r [AC93] and Maurer [Mau93].
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1.2 Outline of the Thesis
Preliminaries. In Chapter 2, we introduce the three distance measures
that we will be using in this thesis. We will present some of the proper-
ties they have and how they are related. The distinguishing advantage and
the statistical distance are standardmeasures for the distance between two
distributions. On the other hand, the maximal bit-prediction advantage is a
special measure that we will use in Chapters 6 and 7.
Definition of secure two-party computation. In Chapter 3, we give a
simplified, formal framework for two-party computation that is univer-
sally composable. We will define two different models: the malicious
model, where the corrupted players may behave arbitrarily, and the semi-
honest model, where the corrupted players follow the protocol, but may
try to obtain asmuch information as they can during the protocol. Wewill
also show that these definitions allow protocols to be composed. Finally,
we show that security in the malicious model does not imply security
in the semi-honest model, and give a weaker security definition for the
semi-honest model for which this implication holds.
Oblivious transfer. In Chapter 4, we will introduce the main topic of
this thesis: oblivious transfer (OT). We will also define a randomized ver-
sion of OT, called randomized OT (ROT), and show that OT and ROT are
equivalent if communication is free. We will then give a very simple pro-
tocol which shows that ROT is symmetric. In connection with the other
protocols, this gives us a simple way to reverse the direction of OT. Fi-
nally, we will present information-theoretic conditions that imply that a pro-
tocol securely implements ROT.
Contribution. Our reduction that reverses ROT and hence also OT is joint
work with Stefan Wolf [WW06], and is much simpler and more efficient
than previous reductions presented in [CS91, OVY93]. The information-
theoretic conditions for the security of ROT presented here build on prior
joint work with Claude Cre´peau, George Savvides and Christian Schaff-
ner [CSSW06]. There, we presented information-theoretic conditions that
imply that a protocol securely implements secure function evaluation in
a sequentially composable model. These conditions replace many ad-
hoc definitions for the security of protocols which often have been faulty.
1.2. Outline of the Thesis 9
Here, we only present conditions for ROT, however we show a stronger
statement about ROT, as our conditions imply that a protocol is universally
composable, and not only sequentially. Also, our conditions have explicit
error terms, which makes them easier to use.
Universal oblivious transfer. In Chapter 5, we will present a protocol
that implements ROT from a weak variant of ROT called universal OT
(UOT). In contrast to ROT, UOT allows a corrupted receiver to receive
any information he wants about the input, as long as he does not receive
too much information. For example, he could be allowed to receive a bit
string of a certain size that is an arbitrary function of his choice of the
sender’s inputs.
Contribution. Our proof, which is also presented in [Wul07], shows that
in the reduction of OT to UOT, the string length of the resulting OT can
be about twice as long as for the bound presented in [DFSS06], which
is optimal for that protocol. (The same bound that we present here has
already been claimed in [Cac98], but the proof presented there was incor-
rect, which was discovered by [DFSS06].) Our proof makes use of a novel
distributed leftover hash lemma, which is a generalization of the well-known
leftover hash lemma [BBR88, ILL89], and of independent interest.
Weakoblivious transfer. In Chapter 6, we introduceweak oblivious trans-
fer (WOT), a weak variant of ROT where the security for both players is
weak, and where the output may be incorrect. We give formal definitions
of WOT in both the semi-honest and the malicious model. We show that
for certain parameters (when the instances of WOT are too weak), it is
impossible to implement ROT from WOT. Then we present several pro-
tocols that implement ROT from WOT, and give upper bounds on how
many instances of WOT are needed. Unfortunately, these reductions do
not meet the impossibility bound.
Contribution. We give several improvements over the results presented in
[DKS99], most of which are also presented in [Wul07]. First of all, we give
new, weaker definitions of WOT that replaces the definition presented in
[DKS99, DFMS04], which was too strong and had only a very limited
range of applications. Also, our definitions make the need for the more
general notion of generalized weak oblivious transfer of [DFMS04] unneces-
sary. For the special case where the WOT does not make any error, we
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present a more detailed proof and a better upper bound on the amount of
instances used than in [DKS99]. Then, using a different error-reduction
protocol that also works with our weaker definitions, we give bounds
for the special case where information is leaked only to one of the two
players, as well as several new bounds for the general case.
Computational weak oblivious transfer. In Chapter 7 we transfer the
results from Chapter 6 to the computational setting. We define computa-
tional weak oblivious transfer (compWOT), which is a computational ver-
sion of WOT, where the adversary may get some additional computational
knowledge about the value he is not supposed to. Using Holenstein’s
hard-core lemma [Hol05, Hol06], we show that any protocol that is se-
cure in the information-theoretic setting can also be used in the computa-
tional setting. Hence, the reductions presented in Chapter 6 can be used
to amplify compWOT to a computationally secure OT.
Contribution. We give a simplified but slightly stronger version of the
pseudo-randomness extraction theorem from [Hol06], and fix the proof given
in [Hol06], where a step was missing. Then, we show that computation-
ally secure OT can be implemented from a large set of compWOT. This
improves the results presented in [Hai04], where only one special case
was solved.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Wewill use the following convention: lower case letters will denote fixed
values and upper case letters will denote random variables and algo-
rithms. Calligraphic letters will denote sets and domains of random vari-
ables. For a random variableX overX , we denote its distribution by PX :
X → [0, 1]with∑x∈X PX(x) = 1. For a given distribution PXY : X×Y →
[0, 1], we write for the marginal distribution PX(x) :=
∑
y∈Y PXY (x, y)
and, if PY (y) 6= 0, PX|Y (x | y) := PXY (x, y)/PY (y) for the conditional
distribution. By xn we denote the list (x0, . . . , xn−1).
We use the function exp(x) := ex. ln(x) denotes the natural logarithm,
and log(x) denotes the logarithm to the base 2.
2.2 Distances between Distributions
In this section, we will introduce two measures for the distance between
two distributions: the distinguishing advantage and the statistical distance.
Definition 2.1. The distinguishing advantage of an algorithm A : U →
{0, 1} (called the distinguisher) to distinguish X from Y , which are ran-
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dom variables over the domain U , is
AdvA(X,Y ) :=
∣∣Pr[A(X) = 1]− Pr[A(Y ) = 1]∣∣ .
The distinguishing advantage of a class D of distinguishers in distin-
guishing X from Y is
AdvD(X,Y ) := max
A∈D
AdvA(X,Y ) .
We have AdvD(X,X) = 0 and AdvD(X,Y ) = AdvD(Y,X) for all X and
Y . It is also easy to see that probabilistic distinguishers do not perform
better than deterministic ones: let AR be a probabilistic distinguisher that
takes additionally some randomness R as input. We have
AdvAR(X,Y ) :=
∑
r
PR(r) ·
∣∣Pr[Ar(X) = 1]− Pr[Ar(Y ) = 1]∣∣ .
Now let r ∈ R be the value that maximizes the expression∣∣Pr[Ar(X) = 1]− Pr[Ar(Y ) = 1]∣∣ .
Then Ar is a deterministic distinguisher with
AdvAr(X,Y ) ≥ AdvAR(X,Y ) .
In the following, we will therefore only consider deterministic distin-
guishers. Lemma 2.1 shows that the triangle inequality holds for the dis-
tinguishing advantage.
Lemma 2.1 (Triangle inequality). For anyX , Y , and Z over U , we have
AdvA(X,Z) ≤ AdvA(X,Y ) + AdvA(Y, Z) .
Proof. We have
AdvA(X,Z) =
∣∣Pr[A(X) = 1]− Pr[A(Z) = 1]∣∣
=
∣∣Pr[A(X) = 1]− Pr[A(Y ) = 1]
+ Pr[A(Y ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z) = 1]∣∣
≤ ∣∣Pr[A(X) = 1]− Pr[A(Y ) = 1]∣∣
+
∣∣Pr[A(Y ) = 1]− Pr[A(Z) = 1]∣∣
= AdvA(X,Y ) + AdvA(Y, Z) .
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It is easy to see that the same also holds for classes of distinguishers, i.e.,
for any D, we have AdvD(X,Z) ≤ AdvD(X,Y ) + AdvD(Y, Z).
Definition 2.2. The statistical distance of two random variables X and Y
(or two distributions PX and PY ) over the same domain U is defined as
∆(X,Y ) = ∆(PX , PY ) :=
1
2
∑
u∈U
∣∣∣PX(u)− PY (u)∣∣∣ .
We say that PX is ε-close to PY , denoted by PX ≡ε PY , if ∆(PX , PY ) ≤ ε.
We say that a random variable X is ε-close to uniform with respect to Y , if
PXY ≡ε PUPY , where PU is the uniform distribution over X .
Lemma 2.2. For all X and Y , we have
∆(X,Y ) = Pr[X ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ] =
∑
u∈T
(
PX(u)− PY (u)
)
for T := {u ∈ U | PX(u) > PY (u)} .
Proof. We have
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
u∈T
(
PX(u)− PY (u)
)
+
1
2
∑
u6∈T
(
PY (u)− PX(u)
)
=
Pr[X ∈ T ]
2
+
Pr[Y 6∈ T ]
2
− Pr[X 6∈ T ]
2
− Pr[Y ∈ T ]
2
= Pr[X ∈ T ]− Pr[Y ∈ T ] .
Lemma 2.3. For all X and Y , we have
∆(X,Y ) = max
S⊆U
(
Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]
)
.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2.2, since
Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]
is maximal for S = T .
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From Lemma 2.3 follows now that
AdvD(X,Y ) = ∆(X,Y ) ,
where D is the class of all (also inefficient) distinguishers.
Lemma 2.4. For any X and Y over U and f : U → V , we have
∆(f(X), f(Y )) ≤ ∆(X,Y ) .
Proof. Let D be the class of all (also inefficient) distinguishers, and let
D(v) be a distinguisher such that
AdvD(f(X), f(Y )) = AdvD(f(X), f(Y )) .
Then, forD′(u) := D(f(u)), we have
AdvD
′
(X,Y ) = AdvD(f(X), f(Y )) .
SinceD′ ∈ D, we have
∆(f(X), f(Y )) = AdvD(f(X), f(Y )) = AdvD
′
(X,Y )
≤ AdvD(X,Y ) = ∆(X,Y ) .
Lemma 2.5. Let PBX and PCY be distributions over {0, 1} × U such that
Pr[B = 1] = Pr[C = 1] = ε .
Then
∆(PX , PY ) ≤ ε+∆(PX|B=0, PY |C=0) .
Proof. For any set S ⊆ U , we have
Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]
= ε · (Pr[X ∈ S | B = 1]− Pr[Y ∈ S | C = 1])
+ (1− ε) · (Pr[X ∈ S | B = 0]− Pr[Y ∈ S | C = 0])
≤ ε+ (Pr[X ∈ S | B = 0]− Pr[Y ∈ S | C = 0])
≤ ε+ max
S′⊆U
(
Pr[X ∈ S′ | B = 0]− Pr[Y ∈ S′ | C = 0]
)
= ε+∆(PX|B=0, PY |C=0) ,
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and therefore
∆(X,Y ) = max
S⊆U
(
Pr[X ∈ S]− Pr[Y ∈ S]
)
≤ ε+∆(PX|B=0, PY |C=0) .
2.3 Prediction of Random Variables
For the case where X ∈ {0, 1}, we will also use another measure of its
closeness to uniform with respect to a random variable Y , themaximal bit-
prediction advantage, which measures how well X can be predicted from
Y . See also Section 2.1 in [Hol06].
Definition 2.3. Let PXY be a distribution over {0, 1} × Y . The maximal
bit-prediction advantage of X from Y is
PredAdv(X | Y ) := 2 ·max
f
Pr[f(Y ) = X ]− 1 .
In other words, if PredAdv(X | Y ) = δ, then we have for all functions
f : Y → {0, 1}
Pr[f(Y ) = X ] ≤ 1 + δ
2
.
First, we show that PredAdv(X | Y ) ≤ 2ε, if and only if X is ε-close to
uniform with respect to Y .
Lemma 2.6. Let PXY be a distribution over {0, 1} × Y . Then
PredAdv(X | Y ) = 2 ·∆(PXY , PUPY ) ,
where PU is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}.
Proof. Obviously, the best function f : Y → {0, 1} for guessing X is
f(y) :=
{
0 if PXY (0, y) ≥ PXY (1, y),
1 otherwise.
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We have
2Pr[f(Y ) = X ]− 1 = 2
∑
y
PY (y)PX|Y=y(f(y))−
∑
y
PY (y)
=
∑
y
PY (y)
(
PX|Y=y(f(y))− (1− PX|Y=y(f(y)))
)
=
∑
y
PY (y)
(
PX|Y=y(f(y))− PX|Y=y(1 − f(y))
)
=
∑
y
PY (y)
∣∣PX|Y=y(0)− PX|Y=y(1)∣∣
=
∑
y
PY (y)
∑
x
∣∣∣PX|Y=y(x)− 1
2
∣∣∣
= 2 ·∆(PXY , PUPY ) .
Lemma 2.7 follows immediately from Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6.
Lemma 2.7. Let PXY be a distribution over {0, 1} × Y , and let f : Y → Y ′.
Then
PredAdv(X | f(Y )) ≤ PredAdv(X | Y ) .
The following lemma shows that for any distribution PXY over {0, 1}×Y ,
we can define an event that has probability 1 − PredAdv(X | Y ), such
that conditioned on that event, X is uniformly distributed given Y , and
therefore no function f(Y ) can predictX .
Lemma 2.8. Let PXY be any distribution over {0, 1} × Y . There exists a con-
ditional distribution PB|XY over {0, 1} × {0, 1} × Y such that
Pr[B = 1] ≤ PredAdv(X | Y )
and such that for all functions f : Y → {0, 1},
Pr[f(Y ) = X | B = 0] = 1/2 .
Proof. We define
PB|X,Y (0 | x, y) := min(PXY (0, y), PXY (1, y))
PXY (x, y)
.
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Using Lemma 2.6, we get
Pr[B = 1] =
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)PB|X,Y (1 | x, y)
=
∑
x,y
PXY (x, y)
(
1− min(PXY (0, y), PXY (1, y))
PXY (x, y)
)
=
∑
x,y
(PXY (x, y)−min(PXY (0, y), PXY (1, y)))
=
∑
y
∣∣PXY (0, y)− PXY (1, y)∣∣
=
∑
y
PY (y)
∑
x
∣∣∣PX|Y=y(x) − 1
2
∣∣∣
= 2 ·∆(PXY , PUPY ) = PredAdv(X | Y ) .
For x ∈ {0, 1}, we have
PX|BY (x | 0, y) =
PX|Y (x | y) · PB|XY (0 | x, y)
PB|Y (0 | y)
=
PX|Y (x | y) ·min(PXY (0, y), PXY (1, y))
PB|Y (0 | y) · PY (y) · PX|Y (x | y)
=
min(PXY (0, y), PXY (1, y))
PBY (0, y)
.
Since PX|BY (x | 0, y) does not depend on x, it must be equal to 1/2, and,
therefore, we have, for all functions f and for all values y,
Pr[f(Y ) = X | B = 0, Y = y] = 1/2 .
Lemma 2.9 shows that the statement of Lemma 2.8 also works in the other
direction. If there exists an event with probability 1 − δ under which X
cannot be guessed from Y with any advantage, thenPredAdv(X | Y ) ≤ δ.
Lemma 2.9. Let PXY be any distribution over {0, 1}×Y . If there exists a con-
ditional distribution PB|XY over {0, 1}× {0, 1}× Y such that for all functions
f : Y → {0, 1} we have
Pr[f(Y ) = X | B = 0] = 1/2 ,
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then
PredAdv(X | Y ) ≤ Pr[B = 1] .
Proof. For any function f , we have
Pr[f(Y ) = X ] = Pr[B = 0] · Pr[f(Y ) = X | B = 0]
+ Pr[B = 1] · Pr[f(Y ) = X | B = 1]
≤ 1/2 · Pr[B = 0] + Pr[B = 1] ,
and, therefore,
PredAdv(X | Y ) = 2 ·max
f
Pr[f(Y ) = X ]− 1
≤ Pr[B = 0] + 2 · Pr[B = 1]− 1 = Pr[B = 1] .
The following lemmas show some rules for PredAdv(X | Y ).
Lemma 2.10. Let PX0Y0 , . . . , PXn−1Yn−1 be distributions over {0, 1} × Yi.
Then
PredAdv(X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xn−1 | Y n) ≤
n−1∏
i=0
PredAdv(Xi | Yi) .
Proof. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let Bi be the random variable defined by
Lemma 2.8. Let B = mini(Bi). If B = 0 then for a j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} we
have Bj = 0. Therefore, Xj is uniformly at random given Yj , and any
f : Yn → {0, 1} will output X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Xn−1 with probability 1/2. The
statement now follows from Lemma 2.9, and from the fact that
Pr[B = 1] =
n−1∏
i=0
Pr[Bi = 1] .
Lemma 2.11. Let PX0Y0 , . . . , PXn−1Yn−1 be distributions over {0, 1}×Yi, and
let Di := Xi ⊕Xn−1. Then
PredAdv(Xn−1 | Y n, Dn−1) ≤ 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− PredAdv(Xi | Yi)) .
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Proof. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let Bi be the random variable defined by
Lemma 2.8, and let B = maxi(Bi). If B = 0 then for all 0 ≤ i < nwe have
Bi = 0, and thereforeXi will be uniformly at random given Yi. It follows
that Xn−1 is independent from (Y
n, Dn−1) and any f : Yn × D → {0, 1}
will output Xn−1 with probability 1/2. The statement now follows from
Lemma 2.9, and from the fact that
Pr[B = 1] = 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− Pr[Bi = 1]) .
Lemma 2.12. For all X,Y ∈ {0, 1} and Z ∈ Z , we have
PredAdv(X ⊕ Y | Y Z) = PredAdv(X | Y Z) .
Proof. If a function f(y, z) can predictX with advantage a, then the func-
tion f ′(y, z) := f(y, z) ⊕ y can predict X ⊕ Y with advantage a, and if
g(y, z) can predict X ⊕ Y with advantage a, then the function g′(y, z) :=
g(y, z)⊕ y can predictX with advantage a.
Chapter 3
Secure Two-Party
Computation
In this chapter we give an introduction to a simplified version of uni-
versally composable two-party computation. We define security in the mali-
cious and the semi-honest models, and show that these definitions allow
protocols to be composed. Finally, we show that security in the mali-
cious model does not imply security in the semi-honest model, and give
a weaker security definition for the semi-honest model for which this im-
plication holds.
3.1 Two-Party Computation
We start with some basic definitions. Our definitions are based on the
formalism by Maurer [Mau06], as well as the formalisms of Backes, Pfitz-
mann and Waidner [PW01, BPW03] and Canetti [Can01], but simplified
and adapted for our needs. Since we will only consider two players in-
teracting with each other, we can simplify the notation. For example, we
will not use any identification tags.
We will model everything in terms of systems which may interact with
other systems or the environment via interfaces. We say that system F
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implements a set I of interfaces. There are two players present, which we
will call A and B. The set of interfaces I can be divided into two sets:
the set IA of the interfaces belonging to player A, and the set IB of the
interfaces belonging to player B.
IA IBF
A system has an internal, possibly infinite supply of randomness. Every
output of the system is a function of the received messages so far, and
the internal randomness. The system is efficient if these functions can be
evaluated efficiently, i.e., using a polynomial time turing machine. The
whole interaction between systems is asynchronous, i.e., there is no global
time.
Two systemsF andG can be composed in parallel to a new system, denoted
by F‖G. The two sub-systems F and G do not interact with each other,
and the resulting system has all the interfaces of the two subsystems.
F
G
We denote the parallel composition of n times the same system F by F‖n.
A system G may use another system F as a subsystem, which we denote
by G(F). G may have some interfaces that are connected to some inter-
faces of F. We use this notation because G can be viewed as a function
that transforms a system F into a system G(F). F‖G is a special case of
this composition.
F
G
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3.2 Distinguishing Systems
Definition 2.1 in Section 2.2, which defines the distinguishing advantage
for random variables, can be generalized to systems in a straightforward
way. A distinguisher is now an algorithm D that interacts with a system
F and outputs 0 or 1.
D
b ∈ {0, 1}
F
Definition 3.1. For two systems F and F′, the distinguishing advantage of
a distinguisher D in distinguishing F from F′ is
AdvD(F,F′) :=
∣∣Pr[D(F) = 1]− Pr[D(F′) = 1]∣∣ .
The distinguishing advantage of a class D of distinguishers in distin-
guishing F from F′ is
AdvD(F,F′) := max
D∈D
AdvD(F,F′) .
The distinguishing advantage of systems still has the same important
properties as the distinguishing advantage for random variables. Obvi-
ously, we have AdvD(F,F) = 0 and AdvD(F′,F) = AdvD(F,F′), for all
F and F′. Furthermore, it also satisfies the triangle inequality:
AdvD(F,F′′) ≤ AdvD(F,F′) + AdvD(F′,F′′) ,
for all D, F, F′, and F′′.
Except in Chapter 7, D will be the set of all possible (also inefficient) dis-
tinguishers. In this case, we will omit the D and only write Adv(F,F′).
We also write F ≡ε F′ for Adv(F,F′) ≤ ε, and F ≡ F′ for Adv(F,F′) = 0.
Similar to Lemma 2.4, we have for all systems G, F, and F′
Adv(G(F),G(F′)) ≤ Adv(F,F′) ,
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since any distinguisher D that distinguishes G(F) from G(F′) with an
advantage of ε can be used to distinguish F from F′, by first applying G.
If D is the class of all efficient distinguishers, then
AdvD(G(F),G(F′)) ≤ AdvD(F,F′) ,
if G is efficient.
Note that for the case where F and F′ have no inputs and output random
variables X and X ′, respectively, this definition is equivalent to Defini-
tion 2.1, and we have
Adv(F,F′) = ∆(X,X ′) .
3.3 Adversaries and Secure Protocols
In this section we define protocols and their security. In the following,
we will often use special systems that only have interfaces for one player
p ∈ {A,B}. We denote such systems by Fp. For any systems FA, FB, and
G, we have
FA(FB(G)) = FB(FA(G)) .
A system of the form P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) = PA(PB(F)) is called a (two-
party) protocol.
PA PB
F
Players may be honest, which means that they follow the protocol, or they
may be corrupted in two different ways. If a player is actively corrupted,
he may behave in an arbitrary way. If a player is passively corrupted, then
he follows the protocol, but forwards everything he sends or receives im-
mediately over an additional interface that we will call auxiliary interface.
Such players are also called honest, but curious.
The set of all corrupted players are called the adversary. Let
A ⊂ {A,B, Â, B̂}
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be the set of corrupted players, where A and B are actively and Â and B̂
passively corrupted players. We will assume that this set is static, i.e., it
is already determined before the protocol starts. We will not mix actively
and passively corrupted players, and consider two different models. In
themalicious model, the playersmay be actively corrupted, and in the semi-
honest model the playersmay be passively corrupted. Furthermore, we can
ignore the case where A = {A,B} or A = {Â, B̂}, as we never have any
requirement for these cases. Therefore, we only have to consider the case
|A| ≤ 1.
Because an adversary may be able to use a system in a different way than
the honest players, we will use the following generalized notion of a sys-
tem. A collection of systems
F = (F∅,F{A},F{B}) , F = (F∅,F{bA},F{bB})
(in the malicious or the semi-honest model) defines a different system FA
for every possible set of corrupted players A, where the honest players
always have the same interfaces as in F∅. This means that in F{A} and
F
{bA}, B must have the same interfaces as in F∅, and in F{B} and F{bB},
A must have the same interfaces as in F∅. Furthermore, the system FA
should be at least as good for the adversary as the system F∅, i.e., the ad-
versary should always be able to behave honestly. FA can be interpreted
as a model of a system where the adversary A can corrupt a part of the
system F.
In the following, we will abuse the term “system”, and also use it for
collections of systems.
3.3.1 The Malicious Model
In the malicious model, the adversary is allowed to cheat actively, in an
arbitrary way. Therefore, we do not have any restrictions on how the
interface to the adversarymay look like, as long as it allows him to behave
honestly, if he wants.
F{B}F{A}F∅
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We will now define the security of protocols. We say that a protocol P
having access to the system F securely implements a system G, if, first
of all, G∅ ≡ P(F∅), i.e., the protocol implements the system G correctly,
given that both players are honest. Additionally, for A = {p}, we require
that the adversary attacking the protocol has no advantage over another
adversary that attacks G directly. We therefore require that there exists
a simulator Sp that simulates exactly what the adversary would get in
the execution of the protocol P(F). Since the adversary may not follow
the protocol, his view of the protocol is in fact the “raw” interface of F,
without his part of the protocol.
Definition 3.2. A protocol P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements a sys-
tem G in the malicious model with an error of at most ε, if
• (Correctness) P(F∅) ≡ε G∅ .
• (Security for A) There exists a system SB (called the simulator for B),
such that
PA(F{B}) ≡ε SB(G{B}) .
• (Security for B) There exists a system SA (called the simulator for A),
such that
PB(F{A}) ≡ε SA(G{A}) .
Note that the protocol P(F) can also be viewed as a new system E, de-
fined by E∅ := P(F∅), E{B} := PA(F{B}), and E{A} := PB(F{A}). Defini-
tion 3.2 could then be stated by comparing the systems E and G.
We do generally not require the simulation to be efficient. Therefore, an
attack that is efficient in P(F) may be mapped to a very inefficient at-
tack in G. This means that if the system G is replaced by the protocol
P(F), the adversary may gain extra possibilities because he may be able
to execute some attacks more efficiently in the new setting. More pre-
cisely, he gains the extra possibility of executing the simulator for free.
Depending on the setting, this may be a problem. For example, if the
simulator allows him to invert a one-way function, a system that relies
on the assumption that inverting this one-way function is hard may not
be secure anymore. On the other hand, if P(F) is used in a protocol
that is information-theoretically secure, the additional, virtual comput-
ing power of the adversary will be of little use to him. Therefore, an
efficient simulation is preferable, even in the model where the adversary
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SA G{A}
G{B} SB
G∅PB
F{B}PA
F{A} PB
PA F∅
≡ε
≡ε
≡ε
Figure 3.1: The three conditions for the security in the malicious model of
a protocol P = (PA‖PB) that uses F = (F∅,F{A},F{B}) and implements
G = (G∅,G{A},G{B}).
is (potentially) unbounded, because it allows the protocol to be used also
in the computational setting. A very important property of this security
definition is that it allows protocols to be composed.
Theorem 3.1 (Composition theorem, malicious model). If P(F) securely
implements G in the malicious model with an error of at most ε1, and Q(H)
securely implements F in the malicious model with an error of at most ε2, then
P(Q(H)) securely implementsG in the malicious model with an error of at most
ε1 + ε2.
Proof. From Q(H∅) ≡ε2 F∅ follows that P(Q(H∅)) ≡ε2 P(F∅). Since
P(F∅) ≡ε1 G∅, it follows from the triangle inequality that
P(Q(H∅)) ≡ε1+ε2 G∅ .
There exists a simulator SB, such that QA(H{B}) ≡ε2 SB(F{B}). It follows
that
PA(QA(H{B})) ≡ε2 PA(SB(F{B})) = SB(PA(F{B})) .
Since there exists a simulator TB such that PA(F{B}) ≡ε1 TB(G{B}), we
have
SB(PA(F{B})) ≡ε1 SB(TB(G{B})) .
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It follows from the triangle inequality that
PA(QA(H{B})) ≡ε1+ε2 SB(TB(G{B})) ,
and hence the protocol is secure for A, with an error of at most ε1 + ε2.
The security for B can be shown in the same way.
3.3.2 The Semi-Honest Model
In the semi-honest model, the adversary is passive. Instead of executing Pp,
a passively corrupted player p executes Pp, which is equal to Pp, but for-
wards everything it sends or receives immediately over an auxiliary in-
terface. Note that the output of the auxiliary interface contains the entire
view of the corrupted player, and therefore also the output of the honest
interface.
PBPB
We require that every system in a collection must also have the same in-
terfaces for the adversary as for the honest player, because the adversary
executes the protocol honestly and can only connect to these interfaces.
However, the system has auxiliary output interfaces for the adversary,
that provide him with some extra information.
F
{bB}F{bA}F∅
Let A = {p̂}. A protocol P(F) securely implements a system G in the
semi-honest model if there exists a simulator Sp that accesses the interac-
tion of the system G{bp} with player p and produces the same output as
Pp. Furthermore, the simulator Sp is not allowed to modify the inputs
and outputs on the interfaces of the honest player, because we require
that the simulated adversary attacking G is also only passively, and not
actively corrupted. Otherwise, the protocol could not be composed. We
get the following definition.
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G
{bA}SA
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G∅
F
{bB}
F
{bA}
PBPA F∅
PA PB
PBPA ≡ε
≡ε
≡ε
G
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Figure 3.2: The three conditions for the security in the semi-honest model of a
two-party protocol P = (PA‖PB) that uses F = (F∅,F{bA},F{bB}) and imple-
ments G = (G∅,G{bA},G{bB}).
Definition 3.3. A protocol P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements G in
the semi-honest model with an error of at most ε, if
• (Correctness) P(F∅) ≡ε G∅ .
• (Security for A) There exists a system SB (called the simulator for B),
that only modifies the auxiliary interfaces, such that
(PA‖PB)(F{bB}) ≡ε SB(G{bB}) .
• (Security for B) There exists a system SA (called the simulator for A),
that only modifies the auxiliary interfaces, such that
(PA‖PB)(F{bA}) ≡ε SA(G{bA}) .
As in the malicious model, we can show that protocols in the semi-honest
model compose.
Theorem 3.2 (Composition theorem, semi-honest model). IfP(F) securely
implements G in the semi-honest model with an error of at most ε1, and Q(H)
securely implementsF in the semi-honest model with an error of at most ε2, then
P(Q(H)) securely implements G in the semi-honest model with an error of at
most ε1 + ε2.
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Proof sketch. From Q(H∅) ≡ε2 F∅ follows that P(Q(H∅)) ≡ε2 P(F∅).
Since P(F∅) ≡ε1 G∅, it follows from the triangle inequality that
P(Q(H∅)) ≡ε1+ε2 G∅ .
There exists a simulator SB, such that (QA‖QB)(H{bB}) ≡ε2 SB(F{bB}). It
follows that
(PA‖PB)((QA‖QB)(H{bB})) ≡ε2 (PA‖PB)(SB(F{bB})) .
Note that PB passes all its communication to B, and SB only modifies
the additional output, but leaves the messages of the honest player un-
changed. Furthermore, all messages that SB sees will be passed along by
the protocol PB. Hence, we can move SB to the outside, i.e.,
(PA‖PB)(SB(F{bB})) = SB((PA‖PB)(F{bB})) .
Since there exists a simulatorTB such that (PA‖PB)(F{bB}) ≡ε1 TB(G{bB}),
we have
SB((PA‖PB)(F{bB})) ≡ε1 SB(TB(G{bB})) .
It follows from the triangle inequality that
(PA‖PB)((QA‖QB)(H{bB})) ≡ε1+ε2 SB(TB(G{bB})) = (SB(TB))(G{bB}) .
Since SB(TB) only modifies the auxiliary output, it is a valid simulator,
and hence the protocol is secure for A with an error of at most ε1+ε2. The
security for B can be shown in the same way.
From passive to active security. Since security against passively cor-
rupted players is quite weak in practice, it is preferable to have a pro-
tocol that is secure against active adversaries. [GMW87] showed that
it is possible to convert any protocols that is secure in the semi-honest
model into a protocol that is secure in the malicious model, by forcing
all players to follow the protocol. To achieve this, every player must
commit himself to all the values he has, and in every step of the proto-
cols, he must proof in zero-knowledge that he has executed the computa-
tion correctly. We will not further comment on this method, and refer to
[GMW87, Cre´90, CvdGT95, DKS99, CLOS02, DFMS04] for any details.
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3.3.3 The Weak Semi-Honest Model
Wewould expect that every protocol that is secure in the malicious model
is also secure in the semi-honest model, since the adversary is restricted
in the latter case. Unfortunately, this is not always true. The security con-
dition in the malicious model only tells us that for any (also semi-honest)
adversary, there exists a malicious adversary for the ideal system. On the
other hand, the security condition in the semi-honest model requires the
adversary for the ideal system to be semi-honest. The following example,
which we call the asymmetric dating problem, illustrates the difference.
Example 1 (The asymmetric dating problem). Let the system F be de-
fined as follows. It receives a value x ∈ {0, 1} from A, and a value
y ∈ {0, 1} from B. Then, it outputs z := x · y to B.
z = x · y
y
F
x
Let Comm be a communication channel, and let the protocol P(Comm)
be defined as follows. PA receives input x ∈ {0, 1} and sends x over
Comm to B. PB receives input y ∈ {0, 1} from B and x over Comm and
outputs z := x · y. Let us look at the security for A. It is easy to see that
P(Comm) securely implements F in the malicious model, since the simu-
lator SB can always input y = 1 to F and obtain the same information as
in P(F). However, the protocol P(Comm) is not secure in the semi-honest
model. Since the simulator SB is not allowed to change the value y, SB
cannot simulate x if y = 0.
We will now present a weaker security definition for the semi-honest
model that is also strictly weaker than the security definition of the ma-
licious model. The only difference to Definition 3.3 is that we allow arbi-
trary simulators, i.e., the simulator may modify the inputs as it likes.
Definition 3.4. A protocol P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements G in
the weak semi-honest model with an error of at most ε, if
• (Correctness) P(F∅) ≡ε G∅ .
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• (Security for A) There exists a system SB (called the simulator for B),
such that
(PA‖PB)(F{bB}) ≡ε SB(G{B}) .
• (Security for B) There exists a system SA (called the simulator for A),
such that
(PA‖PB)(F{bA}) ≡ε SA(G{A}) .
Lemma 3.1. If a protocol P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements G in the
semi-honest model or in the malicious model with an error of at most ε, then it
also securely implements G in the weak semi-honest model with an error of at
most ε.
Proof. It is obvious that security in the semi-honest model implies secu-
rity in the weak semi-honest model.
Let us assume that P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements G in the
malicious model. The correctness conditions in the weak semi-honest
model is the same as in the malicious model.
From the security for A follows that there exists a simulator SB, such that
PA(F{B}) ≡ε SB(G{B}) .
Therefore, we have
(PA‖PB)(F{B}) = PB(PA(F{B})) ≡ε PB(SB(G{B})) = (PB(SB))(G{B}) .
The system TB := PB(SB) is a simulator, which implies security for A in
the weak semi-honest model. The security for B can be shown in the same
way.
Unfortunately, Definition 3.4 is too weak to allow for composition, and
is therefore not a very useful definition for the security of protocols. The
only composition that is possible is the following, where the outer pro-
tocol is secure in the weak semi-honest model, and the inner protocol is
secure in the semi-honest model.
Theorem 3.3 (Simple composition theorem, weak semi-honest model). If
P(F) securely implements G in the weak semi-honest model with an error of
at most ε1, and Q(H) securely implements F in the semi-honest model with an
error of at most ε2, then P(Q(H)) securely implements G in the weak semi-
honest model with an error of at most ε1 + ε2.
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Proof sketch. The proof can be done in the same way as the proof of Theo-
rem 3.2. The only difference is that now, the simulatorTB is not restricted
in any way. The argument works in the same way, except that the result-
ing simulator SB(TB) will not be restricted either. Hence, the protocol is
secure in the weak semi-honest model.
The weak semi-honest model is useful to prove impossibilities, since it
is weaker than the definitions in both the malicious and the semi-honest
models. If we can show that there cannot exist a protocol in the weak
semi-honest model, then there can neither exist a protocol secure in the
malicious, nor in the semi-honest model.
3.4 Discussion
In this chapter we presented a simplified universally composable frame-
work for two-party computation. We did not use the frameworks pre-
sented in [PW01, BPW03] or [Can01] because they are far too complex
and too general for what we will need them. Our simplified framework
will make the results in the following chapters easier to state, and hope-
fully also easier to understand. However, this also means that in order to
fit our results into more general frameworks such as [PW01, BPW03] or
[Can01], additional work will be needed.
If our protocols are to be executed in an environment where more players
are present, we have to make sure that all the other players do not get
any information over the inputs or the outputs of A and B. This can be
achieved by requiring that all our two-party systems are completely in-
dependent of the other players. This means for example that all channels
must be secure and authentic.
Chapter 4
Oblivious Transfer
In this chapter we introduce the primitives oblivious transfer (OT) and
randomized oblivious transfer (ROT), which is a variant of OT where the
inputs of the honest players are chosen at random.
We start by showing that OT and ROT are equivalent if noiseless commu-
nication is available for free. Then, we show that ROT is symmetric by
presenting a protocol that converts an instance of ROT into an instance of
ROT in the opposite direction. This implies that also the direction of OT
can be reversed in a very simple way (Theorem 4.1).
In Theorems 4.2 and 4.3 we give information-theoretic conditions for the
security of ROT. These conditions are similar to the ones presented in
[CSSW06], however we are able to show a stronger result, as our condi-
tions imply that a protocol which satisfies them is universally composable,
and not only sequentially. Also, our conditions have explicit error terms,
which makes them easier to use.
All the results will be stated in the malicious and the semi-honest model.
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4.1 (Randomized) Oblivious Transfer
In this section we will introduce oblivious transfer (OT), and a randomized
version of OT called randomized OT (ROT).
Definition 4.1 (Oblivious transfer). The system
(
n
1
)
-OTℓ (or, if the values
of n and ℓ are clear from the context, OT) is defined as follows. First, it
waits for B to send his input c ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, and sends A ⊥1 . After
having received input xn = (x0, . . . , xn−1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n from A, it sends
y := xc to B. (Notice that OT = OT∅ = OT{A} = OT{B}.)
xn
⊥ c
y = xc
OT
(Note that from now on, the drawings will also include timing aspects.
The time flows from the top to the bottom. The dotted lines indicate wait-
ing points, where the system waits to receive all messages above the line
before it continues.)
We use the same version of OT as [CLOS02], where the sender is notified
about the fact that the receiver has made his choice. Notice that in [Can01,
Fis06], OT has been defined differently. There, the honest sender does not
get this notification. We do not know how to securely implement OT if
the malicious sender does not get to know the fact that the receiver has
made his choice. Therefore, it is preferable to also give this information
to the honest sender. For example, this allows us to easily implement a
bit-commitment protocol from the receiver to the sender. Also, only this
definition allows us to show that OT and ROT are equivalent if noiseless
communication is available for free.
Often, it is much easier to implement a randomized version of OT, called
randomized oblivious transfer (ROT), first. One way of defining ROT would
be to make it equivalent to OT, but where all the inputs are chosen uni-
formly at random by the system. This definition would, however, not be
very useful, because it is too strong: any secure implementation would
1This is a message without any content, which notifies A about the fact that B has sent
his input c.
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have to make sure that all values are indeed chosen uniformly at random,
which can be very difficult. Furthermore, it turns out that in most appli-
cations this is not needed. We will, therefore, define ROT as a collection
of systems, where the adversary can choose her own output.
Definition 4.2 (Randomized oblivious transfer, malicious model). The
system
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ (or, if the values of n and ℓ are clear from the context,
ROT) is defined as a collection of systems
ROT = (ROT∅,ROT{A},ROT{B}) ,
where
• ROT∅: The system chooses uniformly at random the value xn ∈
{0, 1}ℓ·n and c ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. It sends xn to A and (c, y) to B
where y = xc.
• ROT{A}: The system waits for A to send the value xn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n.
Then, it chooses the value c ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} uniformly at random
and sends (c, y) to B, where y = xc.
• ROT{B}: The systemwaits forB to send the value (c, y) ∈ {0, . . . , n−
1} × {0, 1}ℓ. Then, it sets xc = y, chooses the values xi ∈ {0, 1}ℓ
uniformly at random for i 6= c, and sends xn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n to A.
ROT{B}
c, y
xn
ROT∅
c, yxn
ROT{A}
c, y
xn
We will now show that OT and ROT are equivalent if communication is
given for free, by presenting two protocols that securely implement one
system using one instance of the other and a communication channel.
ProtocolROTfromOT = ROTfromOTA‖ROTfromOTB securely implements
ROT from one instance of OT, and is defined as follows.
Protocol 1. ROTfromOTA:
1. Choose xn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n uniformly at random.
2. Send xn to OT.
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3. Receive ⊥ from OT.
4. Output xn.
ROTfromOTB:
1. Choose c ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} uniformly at random.
2. Send c to OT.
3. Receive y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ from OT.
4. Output (c, y).
xn
OT
⊥ c
y
xn ROTfromOTA c, yROTfromOTB
Lemma 4.1. ROTfromOT(
(
n
1
)
-OTℓ) securely implements
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ in the ma-
licious model.
Proof. Obviously, we have ROT∅ ≡ ROTfromOT(OT).
ROTfromOTA(OT) waits for input c from B, and then outputs xn to A,
where all xi are chosen uniformly at random and independently of the
rest, and y := xc to B. We define SB as follows. It waits for input c from B.
Then it chooses y ∈ {0, 1}ℓ uniformly at random, sends (c, y) to ROT{B},
and outputs y.
xn
c, y c
y
xn
xn
⊥
y
c
ROTfromOTA ROT{B} SB
OT
It is easy to verify that ROTfromOTA(OT) ≡ SB(ROT{B}).
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ROTfromOTB(OT) outputs ⊥ to A. It waits for input xn from A, chooses a
value c ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} uniformly at random, and sends c and y := xc to
B. We define SA as follows. It outputs ⊥ to A. It waits for input xn from
A and sends it to ROT{A}.
⊥
xn
SA
xn
c, y
ROT{A}
c
y
⊥
xn
c, y
ROTfromOTBOT
It is easy to verify that ROTfromOTB(OT) ≡ SA(ROT{A}).
To implement OT from ROT, A and B need to be able to communicate.
Wewill therefore additionally need the system Comm, which implements
a communication channel from A to B and from B to A. Note that, in
contrast to OT or ROT, Comm can be used many times.
Definition 4.3 (Channel). The system Comm is defined as follows. Every
time it receives a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ from p ∈ {A,B}, it sends it to the
other player in {A,B}.
We can now state the protocol OTfromROT, which was first proposed in
[BBCS92] to securely implements OT using ROT and Comm. The protocol
is defined as follows.
Protocol 2. OTfromROTA:
1. Receive d ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} from Comm and (x′)n ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n from
ROT.
2. Output ⊥ to A.
3. Receive xn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n from A.
4. Sendmn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n to Comm, wheremi := xi ⊕ x′i+d (mod n).
OTfromROTB:
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1. Receive c ∈ {0, . . . , n−1} fromB and (c′, y′) ∈ {0, . . . , n−1}×{0, 1}ℓ
from ROT.
2. Send d := c′ − c (mod n) to Comm.
3. Receivemn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n from Comm.
4. Output y := mc ⊕ y′ to B.
OTfromROTBOTfromROTA ROT∅
Comm
mn
c′, y′
d
(x′)n
mn
d
y
c
xn
⊥
Lemma 4.2. ROTfromOT(
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ‖Comm) securely implements (n1)-OTℓ
in the malicious model.
Proof. OTfromROT(ROT∅‖Comm) waits for input c from B, and sends ⊥
to A. After receiving xn from A, it sends
y = mc ⊕ y′ = xc ⊕ x′c+d (mod n) ⊕ y′ = xc ⊕ x′c+c′−c (mod n) ⊕ y′
= xc ⊕ x′c ⊕ y′ = xc
to B. (We used the fact that y′ = x′c.) Hence, we have
OT ≡ OTfromROT(ROT∅‖Comm) .
OTfromROTA(ROT{B}‖Comm) waits for (c′, y′) and d from B, and then
outputs ⊥ to A. It then waits for its input xn from A and outputs mn to
B, where mc′−d = xc′−d ⊕ y′, and all the other values mi are uniformly
distributed and independent of the rest. We define SB as follows. It waits
for input (c′, y′) on the ROT{B} interface, and d on the Comm interface.
Then it sends c := c′ − d to OT. It receives y = xc′−d from OT, sets
mc′−d := y ⊕ y′ and chooses all other mi uniformly at random. Finally, it
outputsmn on the Comm interface.
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ROT{B}
Comm
(x′)n
d
mn
OTfromROTA
⊥
xn
SBy
c
OT
⊥
xn
d
mn
c′, y′c′, y′
d
mn
It is easy to verify that OTfromROTA(ROT{B}‖Comm) ≡ SB(OT).
OTfromROTB(ROT{A}‖Comm)waits for (x′)n from theROT interface, and
the input c from B. It chooses d uniformly at random and sends it to
A. After receiving also mn from the Comm interface from A, it outputs
y = mc ⊕ y′ = mc ⊕ x′c+d (mod n) to B. We define SA as follows. It
waits for x′n on the ROT interface, and ⊥ from OT. Then, it chooses d
uniformly at random and sends it to A on the Comm interface. After re-
ceivingmn on the Comm interface, it sends the inputs xi := mi+x′i+d for
i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} to OT.
OTSA
(x′)n
mn
d
c
y
xn
⊥
d
x′n
mn
ROT{A}
Comm d
c′, y′
mn
c
y
OTfromROTB
It is easy to verify that OTfromROTB(ROT{A}‖Comm) ≡ SA(OT).
4.2 Oblivious Transfer is Symmetric
Even though
(
2
1
)
-ROT1 does not look very symmetric, it is almost sym-
metric, as we will show in this section. In particular, we will show that(
2
1
)
-ROT1 can be reversed, using a very simple transformation that we will
call ROTOR. Let
(
2
1
)
-TOR1 be
(
2
1
)
-ROT1 in the opposite direction.
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The protocol ROTOR implements
(
2
1
)
-TOR1 using
(
2
1
)
-ROT1 and is de-
fined as follows.
Protocol 3. ROTORA:
1. Receive (x′0, x
′
1) from ROT.
2. Output (c, y) to A, where y = x′0 and c = x′0 ⊕ x′1.
ROTORB:
1. Receive (c′, y′) from ROT.
2. Output (x0, x1), where x0 = y
′ and x1 = c
′ ⊕ y′.
ROTORA ROTORB
c′
y′x′0
x′1
ROT∅y
c x1
x0
Lemma 4.3. ROTOR(
(
2
1
)
-ROT1) securely implements
(
2
1
)
-TOR1 in the mali-
cious model.
Proof. From
xc = x0 ⊕ (x0 ⊕ x1) · c = y′ ⊕ (y′ ⊕ c′ ⊕ y′) · (x′0 ⊕ x′1)
= y′ ⊕ c′ · (x′0 ⊕ x′1) = y′ ⊕ x′c′ ⊕ x′0 = x′0 = y
follows that TOR∅ ≡ ROTOR(ROT∅). We choose SB := ROTORB and
SA := ROTORA. It is easy to verify that ROTORA(ROT{B}) ≡ SA(TOR{B})
and ROTORB(ROT{A}) ≡ SB(TOR{A}).
Let
(
2
1
)
-TO1 be
(
2
1
)
-OT1 in the opposite direction. Using the protocols
ROTfromOT, ROTOR and OTfromROT, we can implement
(
2
1
)
-OT1 using
one instance of
(
2
1
)
-TO1, and get the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1.
(
2
1
)
-OT1 can be securely implemented in the malicious model
using Comm and one instance of
(
2
1
)
-TO1.
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Protocols that implement
(
2
1
)
-OT1 from
(
2
1
)
-TO1 have previously been
presented in [CS91], and independently in [OVY93]. However, Theo-
rem 4.1 leads to a much simpler and more efficient protocol. The proto-
col of Theorem 4.1 has been proposed in [WW06], together with an even
more efficient protocol, that only used one bit of communication. Unfor-
tunately, that protocol does not work here. The problem is that we are not
able to send the value⊥ to A as soon as B has made his choice, if B makes
his choice before A has given her input.
4.3 In the Semi-Honest Model
In Section 3.3.3 we have seen that security in the malicious model does
not always imply security in the semi-honest model. We will therefore
show that the protocols ROTfromOT, OTfromROT and ROTOR are also
secure in the semi-honest model.
First of all, we have to adjust the definition of ROT. Since a semi-honest
adversary will always choose its random inputs truly random, we have
ROT
{bA} = ROT{bB} = ROT∅.
Lemma 4.4. Protocol ROTfromOT(
(
n
1
)
-OTℓ) securely implements
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ
in the semi-honest model.
Proof. Obviously, we have ROT∅ ≡ ROTfromOT(OT).
(ROTfromOTA‖ROTfromOTB)(OT) outputs xn to A and c (on the auxiliary
interface) and (c, y) to B. SB receives (c, y), outputs c on the auxiliary
interface, and passes (c, y) along to B. We have
(ROTfromOTA‖ROTfromOTB)(OT) ≡ SB(ROT{bB}) .
(ROTfromOTA‖ROTfromOTB)(OT) outputs xn and⊥ (on the auxiliary in-
terface) and xn to A, and (c, y) to B. SA receives xn, outputs xn and ⊥ on
the auxiliary interface and then passes xn along to A. We have
(ROTfromOTA‖ROTfromOTB)(OT) ≡ SA(ROT{bA}) .
Hence, the protocol is secure in the semi-honest model.
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Lemma 4.5. OTfromROT(
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ‖Comm) securely implements (n1)-OTℓ
in the semi-honest model.
Proof. We have seen in Lemma 4.2 thatOT ≡ OTfromROT(ROT∅‖Comm).
(OTfromROTA‖OTfromROTB)(ROT{bB}‖Comm) chooses (c′, y′) uniformly
at random, outputs it on the auxiliary interface to B, and waits for input c
from B. Then it outputs d = c′− c on the auxiliary interface to B, and⊥ to
A. After receiving xn from A, it outputsmn on the auxiliary interface and
y = xc on the normal interface to B, where mc = y′ ⊕ y and all the other
valuesmi are chosen uniformly at random.
SB chooses (c
′, y′) uniformly at random and outputs it on the auxiliary
interface. It waits for input c, passes it along to OT, and outputs d := c′−c
(mod n) on the auxiliary interface. After receiving y = xc from OT, it
outputsmn to B, wheremc = y′ ⊕ y and the remaining values are chosen
uniformly at random. Finally, it outputs y. It is easy to verify that
(OTfromROTA‖OTfromROTB)(ROT{bB}‖Comm) ≡ SB(OT) .
(OTfromROTA‖OTfromROTB)(ROT{bA}‖Comm) chooses (x′)n uniformly
at random and outputs it on the auxiliary interface to A. After receiv-
ing c from B, it chooses d uniformly at random and outputs d and ⊥ to A
on the auxiliary interface. After receiving xn from A, it outputs mn to A,
wheremi := xi ⊕ x′i+d (mod n), and y = xc to B.
SA chooses (x
′)n at random and outputs it on the auxiliary interface to
A. After receiving ⊥ from OT, it outputs d chosen uniformly at random
on the auxiliary interface and passes ⊥ along to A. After receiving xn, it
outputs mn to A, where mi := xi ⊕ x′i+d (mod n), and passes xn along to
OT. It is easy to verify that
OTfromROTB(ROT{bA}‖Comm) ≡ SA(OT) .
Hence, the protocol is secure.
ProtocolROTOR applies a bijective function on the output ofROT. Hence,
all the auxiliary output can be simulated from the output of
(
2
1
)
-TOR1,
and we get the following lemma.
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Lemma 4.6. ROTOR(
(
2
1
)
-ROT1) securely implements
(
2
1
)
-TOR1 in the semi-
honest model.
4.4 Information-Theoretic Security Conditions
We will now present information-theoretic conditions, which imply that
a protocol securely implements ROT either in the malicious or the semi-
honest models.
4.4.1 In the Malicious Model
The following information-theoretic conditions are similar to the condi-
tions presented in [CSSW06], and to the definitions of randomized obliv-
ious transfer used in [DFSS06] and [Wul07]. However, our correctness
condition is stronger, because we require the outputs to be random, if the
players are honest.
Theorem 4.2. A protocolP(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ
with an error of at most ε in the malicious model, if
• (Correctness) P(F∅) ≡ε ROT∅.
• (Security for A) PA(F{B}) interacts over the interfaces belonging to B
(which produces a transcript V ), and after the last input is received, it
outputsXn ∈ {0, 1}ℓ·n to A. There exists a conditional probability distri-
bution PC|XnV that produces a random variable C ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1} such
that (X0, . . . , XC−1, XC+1, . . . , Xn−1) is ε-close to uniform with respect
to (C,XC , V ).
• (Security for B) PB(F{A}) interacts over the interfaces belonging to A
(which produces a transcript U ), and after the last input is received, it
outputs (C, Y ) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} × {0, 1}ℓ to B where C is ε-close to
uniform with respect to U .
Proof. Let P(F) satisfy these conditions. The correctness condition is the
same as in Definition 3.2.
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Let SB first simulate PA(F{B}) which interacts with B and outputs (X ′)n
and the transcript V of the interaction with B. Then, it samples C ac-
cording to PC|Xn=(x′)n,V=v and sends (C, Y ) to ROT{B}, where Y := X ′C .
ROT{B} will output Xn to A, whereXC = X ′C and
(X0, . . . , XC−1, XC+1, . . . , Xn−1)
is chosen uniformly at random and independent from the rest. Since
(X ′0, . . . , X
′
C−1, X
′
C+1, . . . , X
′
n−1)
is ε-close to uniform with respect to (C,XC , V ), we have
(Xn, C, V ) ≡ε ((X ′)n, C, V ) ,
from which follows that
SB(ROT{B}) ≡ε PA(F{B}) .
SA is defined as follows. First, it simulates PB(F{A}), which interacts
with A and outputs (C′, Y ′) and the transcript U of the interaction with
A. Since C′ is ε-close to uniform with respect to U , we have
PC′Y ′U = PC′UPY ′|UC′ ≡ε PCPUPY ′|UC′ ,
where PC is the uniform distribution over {0, 1}. SA now calculates X ′n,
whereX ′i is sampled according to the probability distributions PY ′|U,C′=i,
and sends them toROT{A}. Note that the behavior of the systemPB(F{A})
is known, and therefore also the probability distribution PY ′|U,C′=i. B
receives a value C chosen uniformly at random, and Y = X ′C distributed
according to PY ′|U,C′=c. We have
PCY U = PUPC|UPY ′|UC′ = PUPCPY ′|UC′ ≡ε PC′Y ′U ,
and, therefore,
SA(ROT{A}) ≡ε PB(F{A}) .
Note that the simulation given in Theorem 4.2 is not necessarily efficient.
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4.4.2 In the Semi-Honest Model
Theorem 4.3. Let ε ≥ 0. Let P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) be a protocol that outputs
Xn to A and (C, Y ) to B, and let U be the auxiliary output to A given by PA,
and V be the auxiliary output to B given by PB. P(F) securely implements(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ with an error of at most 3ε in the semi-honest model, if
• (Correctness) P(F∅) ≡ε ROT∅.
• (Security for A) (X0, . . . , XC−1, XC+1, . . . , Xn−1) is ε-close to uniform
with respect to (C, Y, V ).
• (Security for B) C is ε-close to uniform with respect to (Xn, U).
Proof. Let P(F) satisfy these conditions and let PXnCY be the output dis-
tribution of
(
n
1
)
-ROTℓ. We have PXnCY ≡ε PXnCY . Obviously, the cor-
rectness condition is satisfied with an error of at most ε.
We define SB as follows. After receiving (C, Y ), it samples a value V
′
distributed according to PV |CY and outputs (C, Y, V
′). We get
PX0X1CY V = PX0...XC−1XC+1...Xn−1CY V PXC |X0...XC−1XC+1...Xn−1CY V
≡ε PX0...XC−1XC+1...Xn−1CY V PXC |CY
≡ε PCY V PX0...XC−1XC+1...Xn−1PXC |CY
= PCY PV |CY PX0...XC−1XC+1...Xn−1PXC |CY
≡ε PCY PV |CY PX0...XC−1XC+1...Xn−1PXC |CY
= PXnCY PV |CY = PXnCY PV ′|CY
and, therefore,
(PA‖PB)(F{bB}) ≡3ε SB(ROT{bB}) .
We define SA as follows. After receiving X
n, it samples a value U ′ dis-
tributed according to PU|Xn and outputs (X
n, U ′). We get
PXnCY U = PXnCUPY |XnCU ≡ε PXnCUPY |XnC
≡ε PXnUPCPY |XnC = PXnPU|XnPCPY |XnC
≡ε PXnPCPY |XnCPU|Xn = PXnCY PU ′|Xn
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and, therefore,
(PA‖PB)(F{bA}) ≡3ε SA(ROT{bA}) .
One way to sample V ′ according to PV |C,Y is to simulate the protocol
(PA‖PB)(F) until (V ′, C′, Y ′) is received where C′ = C and Y ′ = Y .
This simulation needs exponential time in the parameter ℓ and n, but is
efficient if ℓ and n are small and (PA‖PB)(F) is efficient. Similarly, we
can sample U ′ by simulating the protocol (PA‖PB)(F) until (U ′, (X ′)n) is
received where (X ′)n = Xn.
Chapter 5
Universal Oblivious
Transfer
Universal oblivious transfer (UOT) is a variant of ROT where the security
of the sender is weakened. A malicious receiver is allowed to receive any
information he wants about the sender’s input, as long as he does not re-
ceive too much information. A parameter α specifies a lower bound on
the amount of uncertainty the receiver must have over the sender’s in-
put, measured in terms of min-entropy. UOT was introduced in [Cac98],
together with a protocol that implements ROT from UOT. However, the
security proof contained an error which was discovered in [DFSS06]. It
was showed that ROT with a string length of ℓ can be implemented from
one instance of UOT with an error of at most ε if ℓ ≤ α/4− 34 log(1/ε)− 1,
which is only about half as much as originally claimed in [Cac98].
In Theorem 5.1 we give a new proof for the same protocol that was also
used in [Cac98, DFSS06], and show that the protocol is also secure for
ℓ ≤ α/2− 3 log(1/ε)
with an error of at most 2ε. This improves the bound of [DFSS06] by a
factor of 2 (at the cost of a larger error term) and achieves the bound that
has been originally claimed in [Cac98], which is asymptotically optimal
for this protocol.
Our proof makes use of a new distributed leftover hash lemma (Lemma 5.3)
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which is of independent interest.
5.1 Min-Entropy and Randomness Extraction
In this sectionwe show how almost uniform randomness can be extracted
out of non-uniform randomness. We use the min-entropy to measure the
amount of randomness a random variable has.
Definition 5.1 (Conditional Min-entropy). Let X and Y be random vari-
ables. The min-entropy of X given Y is defined as
Hmin(X | Y ) := min
xy:PXY (x,y)>0
log
1
PX|Y (x | y)
.
We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. For all X , Y , and Z , we have Hmin(X | Z) ≥ Hmin(X | Y Z).
Proof. This inequality follows from
max
x,z
PX|Z(x | z) = max
x,z
∑
y
PY (y)PX|Y Z(x | y, z)
≤ max
x,z
∑
y
PY (y)max
x,y,z
PX|Y Z(x | y, z)
= max
x,y,z
PX|Y Z(x | y, z) .
We will use 2-universal hash functions to extract randomness.
Definition 5.2 ([CW79]). A function h : X × S → Y is called a 2-universal
hash function, if for all x0 6= x1 ∈ X , we have
Pr[h(x0, S) = h(x1, S)] ≤ 1|Y| ,
if S is uniform over S.
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The leftover hash lemma [ILL89] shows that a 2-universal hash function is
able to extract almost all randomness, if some additional uniform ran-
domness S is provided as a catalyst. Notice that the extracted random-
ness is independent from S. A slightly less general form of this lemma has
been proved before in [BBR88], where it was called privacy amplification.
[BBCM95] generalized the notion of privacy amplification to basically the
same statement as [ILL89], in a slightly different notion.
Lemma 5.2 (Leftover hash lemma [BBR88, ILL89]). LetX be a random vari-
able over X and let m > 0. Let h : S × X → {0, 1}m be a 2-universal hash
function. If
m ≤ Hmin(X)− 2 log(1/ε) ,
then for S uniform over S, h(S,X) is ε-close to uniform with respect to S.
Wewill now give a distributed version of the leftover hash lemma, where
two players independently extract randomness from two dependent ran-
dom variables X and Y . The (normal) leftover hash lemma tells us that
if the extracted randomness of X and Y , respectively, is smaller than the
min-entropy ofX and Y , respectively, then the extracted strings are close
to uniform. However, the two extracted strings might depend on each
other. Lemma 5.3 now states that if the total length of the extracted ran-
domness is smaller than the min-entropy of (X,Y ), then the two strings
are also almost independent. Clearly, this bound is optimal.
Lemma 5.3 (Distributed leftover hash lemma). Let X and Y be random
variables over X and Y , and let m,n > 0. Let g : S × X → {0, 1}m and
h : R×Y → {0, 1}n be 2-universal hash functions. If
m ≤ Hmin(X)− 2 log(1/ε) ,
n ≤ Hmin(Y )− 2 log(1/ε) , and
m+ n ≤ Hmin(XY )− 2 log(1/ε) ,
then, for (S,R) uniform over S × R, (g(S,X), h(R, Y )) is ε-close to uniform
with respect to (S,R).
Proof. For anyW having distribution PW overW , andW ′ uniformly dis-
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tributed overW , we have
∆(W,W ′) =
1
2
∑
w
∣∣∣∣PW (w) − 1|W|
∣∣∣∣ = 12
√√√√(∑
w
∣∣∣∣PW (w) − 1|W|
∣∣∣∣
)2
≤1
2
√
|W|
√√√√∑
w
(
PW (w)− 1|W|
)2
=
1
2
√
|W|
√∑
w
P 2W (w) −
1
|W| .
Here we used Lemma A.3.
Let V = g(S,X), V ′ = h(R, Y ) and U,U ′ be two uniform random vari-
ables over {0, 1}m and {0, 1}n. Choosing W := (V, V ′, S,R) and W ′ :=
(U,U ′, S,R) in the above inequality, we get
∆((V, V ′, S,R), (U,U ′, S,R))
≤ 1
2
√
|S||R|2m+n
√∑
vv′sr
P 2V V ′SR(v, v
′, s, r)− 1|S||R|2m+n .
Since
∑
x P
2
X(x) is the collision probability
1 of a random variable X , we
have for (X0, Y0) and (X1, Y1) independently distributed according to
PXY and for uniformly random S0, S1, R0, and R1 that∑
vv′sr
P 2V V ′SR(v, v
′, s, r) = Pr[S0 = S1 ∧R0 = R1]
· Pr[g(X0, S0) = g(X1, S0) ∧ h(Y0, R0) = h(Y1, R0)] .
Because g and h are 2-universal hash functions, we have
Pr[g(X0, S0) = g(X1, S0) ∧ h(Y0, R0) = h(Y1, R0)]
≤ Pr[X0 = X1 ∧ Y0 = Y1] + 2−m Pr[X0 6= X1 ∧ Y0 = Y1]
+ 2−n Pr[X0 = X1 ∧ Y0 6= Y1] + 2−m−n
≤ 2−m−n · ε2 + 2−m2−n · ε2 + 2−n2−m · ε2 + 2−m−n
= (1 + 3ε2)2−m−n ,
1 Let X0 and X1 be distributed according to PX . The collision probability is Pr[X0 =
X1] =
P
PX(x)
2.
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which implies that
∆((V, V ′, S,R), (U,U ′, S,R))
≤ 1
2
√
|S||R|2m+n
√
1
|S||R|
1 + 3ε2
2m+n
− 1|S||R|2m+n ≤
√
3
2
ε .
Notice that Lemma 5.3 implies Lemma 5.2.
5.2 Definition of Universal Oblivious Transfer
We now define universal oblivious transfer, or (α)-
(
2
1
)
-UOTn, which is a
variant of
(
2
1
)
-ROTn that provides weaker security for A. For A = ∅ or
A = {A}, UOT is equal to ROT. But forA = {B}, instead of requiring that
B does not know anything about one of the two strings, we only require
that he does not entirely know both of them, i.e., the a min-entropy of
sender’s input is at least α. Note that from Lemma 2 in [RW05], it follows
that there is no need to use different kinds of Re´nyi-entropies [Re´n61] as
done in [Cac98] or [DFSS06], as they are basically all equivalent to the
min-entropy.
Definition 5.3 (Universal oblivious transfer). The system (α)-
(
2
1
)
-UOTn
(or, if α and n are clear from the context, UOT) is defined as a collection
of systems
UOT = (UOT∅,UOT{A},UOT{B}) ,
where UOT∅ =
(
2
1
)
-ROTn∅ and UOT{A} =
(
2
1
)
-ROTn{A}. UOT{B} is defined
as follows. The system waits for B to input a distribution
p ∈ {PX0X1 | Hmin(X0, X1) ≥ α} ,
where (X0, X1) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n. After receiving p, it chooses (x0, x1)
according to p and outputs (x0, x1) to A.
Notice that our definition UOT is slightly weaker than the definitions
used in [Cac98, DFSS06]. Because our UOT is a weak version of ROT,
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we do not only allow the malicious receiver to receive arbitrary informa-
tion about his input, but we also allow him to freely choose his output.
For example, we allow him to select 2n− α bit and freely fix their values.
UOT will then choose the remaining α bit randomly.
5.3 Universal Oblivious Transfer Amplification
Our protocol ROTfromUOT is basically the same as the protocols used in
[BC97, Cac98, BCW03, DFSS06]. It securely implements
(
1
2
)
-ROTℓ using
one instance of (α)-
(
2
1
)
-UOTn and Comm in the malicious model. Let
h : {0, 1}n × R → {0, 1}ℓ be a 2-universal hash function. The protocol is
defined as follows.
Protocol 4. ROTfromUOTA:
1. Receive (x0, x1) ∈ {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n from UOT.
2. Choose (r0, r1) ∈ R2 uniformly at random.
3. Send (r0, r1) to Comm.
4. Output (u0, u1) ∈ {0, 1}ℓ × {0, 1}ℓ to A, where u0 := h(x0, r0) and
u1 := h(x1, r1).
ROTfromUOTB:
1. Receive (c, w) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}n from UOT and (r0, r1) ∈ R2 from
Comm.
2. Output (c, y) ∈ {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ to B, where y := h(rc, w).
c, y
ROTfromUOTB
r0, r1
c, wUOT∅
Comm
x0, x1
r0, r1
ROTfromUOTA
u0, u1
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We will now show that this protocol indeed achieves the optimal bound
of ℓ ≈ α/2. The proof works roughly as follows. We define an additional
random variable A ∈ {0, 1, 2} that distinguishes between three different
cases, and show that in each case there exists a random variable C such
that U1−C is almost uniform and independent of the rest. If A ∈ {0, 1},
we can lower-bound the min-entropy of X1−A conditioned on XA, and
are therefore able to apply Lemma 5.2 for C = A. If A = 2 we have lower
bounds for the min-entropy of X0, X1, and (X0, X1), which allow us to
apply Lemma 5.3. We need that Pr[A = 2] ≥ ε. If this is not the case, we
ignore the events A = 2 at the cost of an additional error of at most ε.
Theorem 5.1. Let α, n, ℓ, ε > 0. Protocol ROTfromUOT((α)-
(
2
1
)
-UOTn) se-
curely implements
(
2
1
)
-ROTℓ in the malicious model with an error of at most 2ε,
if ℓ ≤ α/2− 3 log(1/ε).
Proof. Obviously, for A = ∅, we have ROTfromUOT(UOT{∅}) ≡ ROT{∅}.
Let A = {A}. ROTfromUOTB(UOT{A}) waits for receiving (x0, x1) and
(r0, r1) from A and then outputs (c, y) to B, where c is chosen uniformly at
random and y = h(xc, rc). We define SA as follows. It waits for receiving
(x0, x1) and (r0, r1) from A and sends (h(x0, r0), h(x1, r1)) to ROT. It is
easy to see that ROTfromUOTB(UOT{A}) = SA(ROT).
Let A = {B}. The system ROTfromUOTA(UOT{B}) receives the value p
from B, and then outputs (U0, U1) to A and (R0, R1) to B. In the following,
we will implicitly condition on the values P = p. Let
Si :=
{
xi ∈ Xi : Pr[Xi = xi] ≤ 2−α/2
}
,
for i ∈ {0, 1}. Let
g(x0, x1) :=

2 if (x0 ∈ S0) ∧ (x1 ∈ S1)
0 if (x0 6∈ S0) ∧ (x1 ∈ S1)
1 if (x0 ∈ S0) ∧ (x1 6∈ S1)
u if (x0 6∈ S0) ∧ (x1 6∈ S1) ,
(5.1)
and A := g(X0, X1), for u chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}. If
Pr[A = 2] < ε, let E be the event that A < 2, and let E be the event with
probability 1 otherwise. We have Pr[E ] ≥ 1− ε, and the event (A = 2)∩E
either has probability 0 or at least ε. Let C = min(A, 1).
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• For A = a ∈ {0, 1} and Pr[A = a ∧ E ] > 0, we have C = a. All
xa ∈ Sa have Pr[Xa = xa | A = a ∧ E ] = 0. For all xa 6∈ Sa we have
Pr[Xa = xa ∧A = a ∧ E ]
= Pr[Xa = xa ∧X1−a ∈ S1−a] + Pr[Xa = xa ∧X1−a 6∈ S1−a]
2
≥ Pr[Xa = xa]
2
≥ 2−α/2−1 .
It follows that
Pr[X1−a = x1−a | Xa = xa ∧A = a ∧ E ]
=
Pr[X1−a = x1−a ∧Xa = xa ∧A = a ∧ E ]
Pr[Xa = xa ∧A = a ∧ E ]
≤ 2−α/2−α/2−1 = 2−α/2+1 ,
and hence, Hmin(X1−C | XC , A = a, E) ≥ α/2 − 1. Since R0 and
R1 are uniformly distributed and independent of the rest, it follows
from Lemma 5.2 that, conditioned on (A = a)∩E , U1−C is ε-close to
uniform with respect to (R0, R1, UC).
• If A = 2 and Pr[A = 2 ∧ E ] > 0, then C = 1, Pr[A = 2 ∧ E ] ≥ ε,
Pr[X0 = x0 ∧X1 = x1 | A = 2 ∧ E ] ≤ 2−α/ε, and Pr[Xi = xi | A =
2 ∧ E ] ≤ 2−α/2/ε, for i ∈ {0, 1}. It follows that
Hmin(X0 | A = 2 ∧ E) ≥ α/2− log(1/ε)
Hmin(X1 | A = 2 ∧ E) ≥ α/2− log(1/ε)
Hmin(X0X1 | A = 2 ∧ E) ≥ α− log(1/ε) .
Since R0 and R1 are uniformly distributed and independent of the
rest, it follows from Lemma 5.3 that conditioned on (A = 2) ∩ E ,
(U0, U1) is ε-close to uniform with respect to (R0, R1), from which
follows that U1−C is ε-close to uniform with respect to (R0, R1, UC).
Therefore, for all a ∈ {0, 1, 2}, conditioned on (A = a) ∩ E , the distribu-
tion of U1−C is ε-close to uniform with respect to (R0, R1, C, UC). Since
Pr[E ] ≥ 1− ε, it follows from Lemma 2.5 that U1−C is 2ε-close to uniform
with respect to (R0, R1, C, UC). Because this holds for every P = p, it fol-
lows that U1−C is 2ε-close to uniform with respect to (C,UC , P,R0, R1).
We define SB as follows. After receiving p : X0 × X1 → [0, 1] from B, it
simulates UOT{B} on input p, from which it gets the values X ′0 and X ′1,
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distributed according to p. It calculates C′ = min(g(X ′0, X
′
1), 1) according
to (5.1). Then it choses R′0 and R
′
1 uniformly at random from R, sends
(C′, h(X ′C′ , R
′
C′)) to ROT{B} and outputs (R′0, R′1) on the Comm interface.
ROT{B} will output (U ′0, U ′1) to A, where U ′C = h(X ′C′ , RC′) and U ′1−C is
chosen uniformly at random and independent from the rest. Since U1−C
is 2ε-close to uniform with respect to (C,P, UC , R0, R1), it is easy to see
that
(U ′0, U
′
1, C
′, P,R′0, R
′
1) ≡2ε (U0, U1, C, P,R0, R1) ,
from which follows that
ROTfromUOTA(UOT{B}) ≡2ε SB(ROT{B}) .
5.4 Applications
The definition of UOT emerged as a generalization of the protocol pre-
sented in [BC97, BCW03] to implement string OT out of bit OT. Therefore
it is not surprising that the reduction we presented in this chapter can
be used to implement string OT from bit OT. Asymptotically, our proto-
col also achieves the same bound as the protocol of [BC97, BCW03] for
this task. Our protocol can also be used to implement OT from GOT,
which leads to better bounds than the ones presented in [BC97, BCW03]
or [DFSS06].
Recently, another very interesting application of UOT has been presented:
in [DFR+06], it was shown that in the bounded quantum-storage model, it is
possible to implement a simple protocol that achieves a quantum version
of UOT. Whereas it is not clear how the results of [DFSS06] can be used
in that setting to implement OT, they showed that a simplified version of
our proof (only requiring the normal leftover hash lemma) can directly
be applied, using a quantum version of the leftover hash lemma, called
privacy amplification against quantum adversaries [RK05, Ren05]. It is also
possible to generalize our distributed leftover hash lemma to the quan-
tum setting, and therefore the proof we present in this chapter can also be
used in the setting of [DFR+06] to improve the efficiency of their reduc-
tion.
Chapter 6
Weak Oblivious Transfer
Weak oblivious transfer (WOT), introduced in [DKS99], is a weak variant
of ROT where both players may obtain additional information about the
other player’s input, and where the output may have some errors. In
[DKS99] it was used as a tool to construct OT from unfair primitives, i.e.,
primitives where the adversary is more powerful than the honest partic-
ipants, such as the unfair noisy channel. WOT is parameterized by three
parameters, p, q, and ε, where pmeasures the amount of side information
that the sender gets about the receiver’s choice bit, q the amount of side
information the receiver gets about the sender’s second input bit, and ε is
the maximal probability that an error occurs.
While the definition of WOT is very informal in [DKS99], the definition
used in [DFMS04] (which gives an ideal functionality of WOT) made im-
plicitly a quite strong assumption, namely that the event that an adver-
sary gains information is independent of the error. Unfortunately, the
protocol used in [DKS99, DFMS04] based on unfair noisy channels does
not achieve these strong requirements. We propose two new, weaker def-
initions of WOT, one for the semi-honest (Definition 6.1) and one for the
malicious model (Definition 6.2), that do not have these assumptions.
Also, our definitions make the use of generalized weak oblivious transfer
[DFMS04], at least for the protocols we have at the moment, unnecessary.
In Theorem 6.1 we restate the impossibility result from [DKS99] that there
does not exist a protocol which implements OT fromWOT if p+q+2ε ≥ 1.
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Figure 6.1: The bounds on the parameters p, q, and ε for WOT. (0): Impossi-
bility, Theorem 6.1. (1): Special case where ε = 0 or ε is small, Theorem 6.2
and Corollary 6.2. (2-3): Special cases where p = 0 or q = 0, Theorem 6.3 and
Corollary 6.1. (4-7): General case where p, q, ε > 0, Theorem 6.4.
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Then, we give several protocols that implement ROT from WOT. In The-
orem 6.2, we show that the bound of p + q < 1 and ε = 0 presented
in [DKS99] can also be achieved using our definition, both in the semi-
honest and the malicious model. Furthermore, we give a more detailed
analysis of the protocols’s efficiency. For the case where ε > 0, our new
definition makes it necessary to use a different protocol to reduce the er-
ror ε, which implies that we are not able to achieve the same bound as
[DKS99]. In Theorems 6.3 and Corollary 6.1, we show that for the special
case where either p = 0 or q = 0 holds, ROT can securely be implemented
fromWOT in the semi-honest model if
(p = 0 ∧ √q + 2ε < 1) ∨ (q = 0 ∧ √p+ 2ε < 1) .
We achieve these bounds very easily by using an interesting connection
to key agreement protocols [HR05, Hol06] and the statistical distance po-
larization problem [SV99, Vad99]. For the general case where p, q, and ε
may be larger than 0, we show in Theorem 6.4 that if
p+ q + 2ε ≤ 0.24
or
(p+ 22q + 44ε < 1) ∨ (22p+ q + 44ε < 1) ∨ (7√p+ q + 2ε < 1) ,
ROT can efficiently be implemented fromWOT secure in the semi-honest
model. These bounds do not achieve the bound of p + q + 2ε < 0.45
from [DKS99] for all values p, q, and ε, but they are better for the cases
where two parameters are small and one is large. Finally, we show in
Corollary 6.2 that we can also implement ROT from WOT in the semi-
honest model if
(1− p− q)4 < −178 · log(1− 2ε) ,
which means that if ε is small enough, then we can achieve OT for all
values p+ q < 1.
6.1 Definition of WOT
In this section we give formal definitions of WOT. Because our protocols
will reduce the information of the adversary by using the XOR of several
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values, the maximum bit-prediction advantage (PredAdv) turns out to
be a good measure for the adversary’s side information. Furthermore, it
has the advantage that we can easily find a computational version of this
measure, which will be very useful in Chapter 7. Our definition of WOT
is inspired by the definition of weak bit agreement in [Hol05, Hol06].
6.1.1 In the Semi-Honest Model
We start with the definition of WOT in the semi-honest model. Since the
adversary is not able to choose which information he would like to ob-
tain in the semi-honest model, he may only obtain whatever information
the functionality provides him with. But we do not want to fix this in-
formation, as we want to cover a wide range of possibilities — we might
not even know what information the functionality will provide to the ad-
versary. Therefore, we cannot define an ideal functionality. Instead, we
will define a set of ideal functionalities, and assume that one instance of
this set is provided to us, but we may not know which instance. We will
define this set of ideal functionalities by a list of properties that the ideal
functionality must satisfy.
Definition 6.1 (Weak oblivious transfer, semi-honest model). Let
F = (F∅,F{bA},F{bB})
be a collection of systems in the semi-honest model. LetF output (X0, X1)
to A and (C, Y ) to B. Let U be the auxiliary output to A by F{A} and V
be the auxiliary output to B by F{B}. Let E := XC ⊕ Y . F implements
(p, q, ε)-WOT in the semi-honest model, if
• (Correctness) Pr[E = 1] ≤ ε.
• (Security for A) PredAdv(X1−C | V,E) ≤ q.
• (Security for B) PredAdv(C | U,E) ≤ p.
We also use (p, q)-WOT for (p, q, 0)-WOT.
It is not immediately clear why we require that X1−C and C are diffi-
cult to guess even when additionally the value E is given. We do this
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for allowing the adversary to learn the error during the protocol with-
out getting additional information about X1−C or C. For example, in the
protocol E-Reduce, B may get to know XC during the protocol, which
means that he gets to know E = Y ⊕XC . Therefore, we must make sure
that his side information about X1−C is not increased if he gets to know
E. Note, however, that for the protocols we present here, it would be
sufficient to only require PredAdv(C | U) ≤ p for the security for B, be-
cause E is never leaked to A. We do not use this definition in order to
keep WOT symmetric, and to get a stronger Theorem 7.2 that is simpler
to proof. (Otherwise, Theorem 7.2 would not work for all protocols, but
just for the protocols we present here.)
We will now show that the conditions of WOT suffice to implement ROT
in the semi-honest model. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 6.1. Let PU be the uniform distribution over {0, 1} and let PCX0X1 be
a distribution over {0, 1}3 for which PCX1X0 ≡ε PUPX1X0 and PX1−CXCC ≡ε
PUPXCC holds. Then ∆(PCX0X1 , PUPUPU ) ≤ 4ε.
Proof. Let a := PCX1X0(0, 0, 0), b := PCX1X0(0, 0, 1), c := PCX1X0(0, 1, 0),
d := PCX1X0(0, 1, 1), . . . , and let h := PCX1X0(1, 1, 1). From PCX1X0 ≡ε
PUPX1X0 and Lemma A.6, we get
|a− e|+ |b − f |+ |c− g|+ |d− h| ≤ 2ε ,
and from PX1−CXCC ≡ε PUPXCC and Lemma A.6
|a− c|+ |b− d|+ |e− f |+ |g − h| ≤ 2ε .
Adding up the two inequalities, we get
|e− a|+ |a− c|+ |c− g|+ |g − h|
+ |h− d|+ |d− b|+ |b− f |+ |f − e| ≤ 4ε . (6.1)
It is easy to see that the difference between the minimal and the maximal
values in the set {a, . . . , h} is at most 2ε, and that the statistical distance
is maximized for (6.1) by distributions where n ∈ {1, . . . , 7} values have
equal probability 1/8+2ε−εn/4, and 8−n values have equal probability
1/8− εn/4. The statistical distance is εn(2−n/4), which is maximized for
n = 41, where it is 4ε.
1Note that such a distribution does not satisfy our original, stricter requirements. Values
that do satisfy them are a = e = f = 1/2 + 5/4 · ε and b = d = h = g = c = 1/2 − 3/4 · ε,
which gives a statistical distance of 3.75.
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Lemma 6.2. If a protocol F implements (ε, ε, ε)-WOT, then it implements(
2
1
)
-ROT1 secure in the semi-honest model, with an error of at most 9ε.
Proof. Let (X0, X1, C, Y ) be the output of F∅, let U be the auxiliary output
of F{A} to A and V the auxiliary output of F{B} to B. From Lemma 2.6 fol-
lows thatC is ε/2-close to uniformwith respect to (E,X0, X1, U), and that
X1−C is ε/2-close to uniform with respect to (E,C, Y, V ). Let PX0X1CY be
the output distribution of ROT∅.
Lemma 6.1 implies that PX0X1C ≡2ε PX0X1C . Since Pr[Y 6= XC ] ≤ ε, we
have
PX0X1CY ≡ε PX0X1CPY |X0X1C ≡2ε PX0X1CY .
We can now apply Theorem 4.3.
6.1.2 In the Malicious Model
Wewill now also give a formal definition of WOT in the malicious model.
The definition differs from the semi-honest case in two important points.
Firstly, since we do not have any protocol that can do error reduction in
the malicious model, we will only define the case without any error, i.e.,
ε = 0. Secondly, for the security of A, we require that the XOR of the two
input bits is difficult to guess, because this is a much easier requirement
than the standard approach used in Theorem 4.2. Lemma 6.3 shows that
the two conditions are equivalent. Notice that the security of the XOR
does not suffice in the semi-honest model, and, therefore, this trick can-
not be applied there. On the other hand, since in the malicious model a
corrupted B may choose C freely, we cannot use Lemma 6.1, and, there-
fore, the condition Pr[Y 6= XC ] = 0 would not suffice in the malicious
model.
Definition 6.2 (Weak oblivious transfer, malicious model). Let
F = (F∅,F{A},F{B})
be a collection of systems in the malicious model. The system F imple-
ments (p, q)-WOT (or, if p and q are clear from the context, WOT) in the
malicious model, if
• (Correctness): F∅ ≡ ROT.
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• (Security for A): The system F{B} interacts over the interfaces be-
longing to B (which produces a transcript V ), and after the last in-
put is received over these interfaces, it outputs (X0, X1) ∈ {0, 1}2 to
A where PredAdv(X0 ⊕X1 | V ) ≤ q.
• (Security for B) The system F{A} interacts over the interfaces be-
longing to A (which produces a transcript U ), and after the last in-
put is received over these interfaces, it outputs (C, Y ) ∈ {0, 1}2 to B
where PredAdv(C | U) ≤ p.
Notice that since we are now in the malicious model, the adversary is able
to choose what information he would like to receive, and we could define
an ideal functionality in a similar way as we did in Definition 5.3 for UOT.
We did not do this in order to be closer to Definition 6.1 and Theorem 4.2.
Again, we will first show that WOT suffices to implement ROT in the
malicious model. We will need the following lemma, which has already
been proved in [DFSS06].
Lemma 6.3. Let PX0X1 be given. There exists a random variable C distributed
according to a conditional distribution PC|X0,X1 such that X1−C is uniform
with respect to (C,XC), if and only if X0 ⊕X1 is uniformly distributed.
Proof. Let PX0X1C be a distribution such that X1−C is uniform with re-
spect to (C,XC). We have
Pr[X0 ⊕X1 = 0] = PX0X1C(0, 0, 0) + PX0X1C(1, 1, 0)
+ PX0X1C(0, 0, 1) + PX0X1C(1, 1, 1)
= PX0X1C(0, 1, 0) + PX0X1C(1, 0, 0)
+ PX0X1C(1, 0, 1) + PX0X1C(0, 1, 1)
= Pr[X0 ⊕X1 = 1] .
Hence,X0 ⊕X1 is uniformly distributed.
The other direction is slightly more complicated. Let X0 ⊕ X1 be uni-
formly distributed. We choose
PC|X0,X1(0 | x0, x1) :=
min(PX0X1(x0, 0), PX0X1(x0, 1))
PX0X1(x0, x1)
.
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For C = 0 and x0 ∈ {0, 1}, we have
PX0X1C(x0, 0, 0) = PX0X1(x0, 0) · PC|X0X1(0 | x0, 0)
= min(PX0X1(x0, 0), PX0X1(x0, 1))
= PX0X1C(x0, 1, 0) .
SinceX0 ⊕X1 is uniformly distributed, we have
PX0X1(0, 0)− PX0X1(0, 1) = PX0X1(1, 0)− PX0X1(1, 1) ,
which implies that for C = 1 and x1 ∈ {0, 1},
PX0X1C(0, x1, 1) = PX0X1(0, x1) · (1 − PC|X0X1(0 | 0, x1))
= PX0X1(0, x1)−min(PX0X1(0, 0), PX0X1(0, 1))
= max(0, PX0X1(0, x1)− PX0X1(0, 1− x1)
= max(0, PX0X1(1, x1)− PX0X1(1, 1− x1)
= PX0X1C(1, x1, 1) .
Hence, for c ∈ {0, 1} and xc ∈ {0, 1},
PX1−CXCC(0, xc, c) = PX1−CXCC(1, xc, c) =
1
2
PXCC(xc, c) .
Therefore,X1−C is uniform with respect to (C,XC).
Lemma 6.4. If a protocol F implements (ε, ε)-WOT in the malicious model,
then it implements
(
2
1
)
-ROT1 secure in the malicious model, with an error of at
most ε/2.
Proof. Let A = {B}. From Lemma 2.6 follows that there exists (X ′0, X ′1),
such that
∆((X0, X1, V ), (X
′
0, X
′
1, V )) ≤ ε/2
and X ′0 ⊕X ′1 is uniform with respect to V . We choose PC|X′0,X′1,V as pro-
posed in Lemma 6.3. X ′1−C is uniform with respect to (C,X
′
C , V ), and,
therefore,X1−C is ε/2-close to uniform with respect to (C,XC , V ).
LetA = {A}. From Lemma 2.6 follows that C is ε/2-close to uniformwith
respect to U .
The lemma follows now from Theorem 4.2.
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6.1.3 Relation to Previous Definitions
Difference to WOT from [DKS99, DFMS04]. Besides the fact that we
only consider a randomized version of WOT, the difference of our defi-
nition of (p, q, ε)-WOT to the definitions used in [DKS99, DFMS04] is that
we do not specify exactly what a malicious player may receive, but we
only require that his output should not give too much information about
the bits X1−C and C. This means that a malicious player may, for ex-
ample, always receive whether an error occurred in the transmission or
not, if that information is independent of the inputs. The most important
difference is, however, that our definitions do not require that the error
must occur independently of the event that a player gets side informa-
tion, which is very important when we want to apply it.
Lemmas 2.8 and 2.9 imply that our definitions still are quite close to the
definitions from [DKS99, DFMS04], because there exist events with prob-
ability 1 − p and 1 − q, such that, if they occur, then the adversary does
not get any side information.
Connection to GWOT from [DFMS04]. In [DFMS04], Generalized WOT
(GWOT) was introduced to improve the achievable range of the reduc-
tions. It was shown in Lemma 3 in [DFMS04] that in the reductions they
used, WOT can be replaced by a GWOT, if the probability to guess the
bits X1−C and C, respectively, remain the same for the adversary. Since
we defined WOT over the advantage to guess these values, Lemma 3 in
[DFMS04] is not needed anymore, and therefore, at least for the moment,
the use of GWOT does not give any advantage over WOT.
6.2 Impossibility Results
In this section we prove the impossibility result stated in [DKS99], that
WOT cannot be amplified if p + q + 2ε ≥ 1. Note that the proof does
not work for the definition of WOT used in [DKS99, DFMS04]. We start
with the protocol SimWOT(p,q)(Comm) that implements (p, q, ε)-WOT for
p+ q + 2ε = 1 in the semi-honest model.
Protocol 5. SimWOTA:
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1. Choose (x′0, x
′
1) ∈ {0, 1}2 uniformly at random.
2. With probability q, send a = (x′0, x
′
1) to Comm. Otherwise, send
a = ⊥ to Comm.
3. Receive b.
4. If b = ⊥ then output (x0, x1) := (x′0, x′1). Otherwise, b = (c, y) ∈
{0, 1}2. Output (x0, x1), where xc := y and x1−c := x′1−c.
SimWOTB:
1. Choose (c′, y′) ∈ {0, 1}2 uniformly at random.
2. Receive a.
3. If a = ⊥ then output (c, y) := (c′, y′) and send with probability
p/(1 − q) the value (c′, y′) to Comm, and ⊥ otherwise. Otherwise,
a = (x′0, x
′
1) ∈ {0, 1}2. Send ⊥ to Comm and outputs (c, y) :=
(c′, x′c′).
Lemma 6.5. Protocol SimWOT(p,q)(Comm) securely implements (p, q, (1 −
p− q)/2)-WOT in the semi-honest model.
Proof. Let E := Y ⊕XC . With probability q, B will adjust his output such
that Y = XC , and with probability (1− q) ·p/(1− q) = p, A will adjust her
output such thatXC = Y . With probability 1− p− q, the values (X0, X1)
and (C, Y )will be chosen uniformly at random. Therefore, we have
Pr[Y 6= XC ] = (1 − p− q)/2 .
When SimWOTA sends ⊥ to Comm, then the valueX1−C is uniform with
respect (V,E). From Lemma 2.9 follows that
PredAdv(X1−C | V,E) ≤ q .
When SimWOTB sends ⊥ to Comm, then the value C is uniform with
respect (U,E). From Lemma 2.9 follows that
PredAdv(C | U,E) ≤ p .
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We need the following well-known fact.
Lemma 6.6. There cannot exist a protocolP(Comm) that securely implements(
2
1
)
-OT1 in the weak semi-honest model.
Theorem 6.1. For any p, q, und ε with p + q + 2ε ≥ 1 and for any n, there
cannot exist a protocol P((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm) that securely implements(
2
1
)
-OT1 in the semi-honest or the malicious model.
Proof. From Lemma 3.1 follows that P is secure in the weak semi-honest
model. Therefore, it would follow from Lemma 6.5 and Theorem 3.3 that
the protocol
P(SimWOT(p,q)(Comm)‖n‖Comm)
would implement
(
2
1
)
-OT1 from scratch in the weak semi-honest model,
which contradicts Lemma 6.6.
6.3 Basic Protocols for WOT Amplification
We now present the three basic protocols that we use to implement ROT
from WOT. The protocol R-Reduce allows for reducing the parameter p,
and the protocol S-Reduce is used to reduce the parameter q. Both reduc-
tions were already used in [CK88, DKS99, DFMS04, Hai04], as well as in
[HKN+05, MPW07] for building OT combiners. The protocol E-Reduce
is used to reduce the parameter ε. Whereas the other two protocols are se-
cure in bothmodels, E-Reduce is merely secure in the semi-honest model.
The same protocol was also used in [Hai04] and is the one-way variant
of the protocol E-Reduce presented in [DKS99]. Notice that since we de-
fined WOT to be a randomized primitive, we are not able to choose the
input, which makes the protocols slightly more complicated.
We first present all protocols in the semi-honest model, and later give the
proofs for the malicious model.
6.3.1 In the Semi-Honest Model
The protocol R-Reduce(WOT‖n‖Comm) is defined as follows.
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Protocol 6. R-ReduceA:
1. Receive (x0,i, x1,i) from the ith WOT, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
2. Receive dn−1 = (d0, . . . , dn−2) from Comm. Set dn−1 := 0.
3. Output (x0, x1) := (
⊕n−1
i=0 xdi,i,
⊕n−1
i=0 xdi⊕1,i).
R-ReduceB:
1. Receive (ci, yi) from the ith WOT, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
2. Send dn−1 = (d0, . . . , dn−2) to Comm, where di := cn−1 ⊕ ci.
3. Output (c, y) := (cn−1,
⊕n−1
i=0 yi).
c, y
R-ReduceB
dn−1
cn, yn
x0, x1
R-ReduceA
Comm
WOT∅
dn−1
xn0 , x
n
1
Lemma 6.7. The protocolR-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm) securely imple-
ments (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT in the semi-honest model, where p′ = 1− (1−p)n ≤ np,
q′ = qn ≤ e−n(1−q), and ε′ = (1− (1− 2ε)n)/2 ≤ nε.
Proof. Let Ei := Yi ⊕XCi,i, and E := Y ⊕XC . We have
E = Y ⊕XC =
n−1⊕
i=0
Yi ⊕
n−1⊕
i=0
XC⊕Di,i =
n−1⊕
i=0
(Yi ⊕XCi,i) =
n−1⊕
i=0
Ei .
Let A = ∅. Since Pr[Ei = 1] ≤ ε, it follows from Lemma A.8 that
Pr[E = 1] ≤ 1− (1− 2ε)
n
2
≤ nε .
Let A = {B}, and let Vi be the auxiliary output to B from the ith instance
of WOT{B}. The auxiliary output of the protocol to B is V := V n. Since
X1−C :=
n−1⊕
i=0
X1−Di⊕C,i =
n−1⊕
i=0
X1−Ci,i ,
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and because E is a function of En, it follows from Lemmas 2.7, 2.10 and
A.4 that
PredAdv(X1−C | V,E) ≤ PredAdv(X1−C | V n, En)
=
n−1∏
i=0
PredAdv(X1−Ci,i | Vi, Ei)
≤ qn ≤ e−n(1−q) .
Let A = {A}, and let Ui be the auxiliary output to A from the ith instance
of WOT{A}. The auxiliary output of the protocol to A is U := (Un, Dn−1).
Because E is a function of En, Lemmas 2.7, 2.11 and A.9 imply that
PredAdv(C | U,E) ≤ PredAdv(C | Un, En, Dn−1)
≤ 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1 − PredAdv(Ci | Ui, Ei))
≤ 1− (1 − p)n ≤ np .
Wewill also need a protocolS-Reduce that reduces the error p. To achieve
this, we can simply use the protocol R-Reduce in the opposite direc-
tion, together with the protocol ROTOR. We need the fact that Protocol
ROTOR(WOT) implements WOT in the inverse direction.
Lemma 6.8. Protocol ROTOR((p, q, ε)-WOT) implements (q, p, ε)-WOT in
the opposite direction, secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. Let (X ′0, X
′
1, C
′, Y ′) be the output of ROT∅, and let (X0, X1, C, Y )
be the output of ROTOR. Let U ′ be the auxiliary output to A by ROT{A},
and let V ′ be the auxiliary output to B by ROT{B}. The auxiliary out-
put output to A by ROTOR is V = U ′, and the auxiliary output to B by
ROTOR is U = V ′.
LetE := Y ⊕XC . It is easy to verify thatE′ = Y ′⊕X ′C′ = E, and therefore
that the correctness condition is satisfied. From Lemma 2.12 follows that
PredAdv(X1−C | V,E) = PredAdv(X1−C ⊕ (E ⊕ Y ) | V,E)
= PredAdv(X1−C ⊕XC | V,E′)
= PredAdv(C′ | U ′, E′) ≤ p
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and
PredAdv(C | U,E) = PredAdv(X ′0 ⊕X ′1 | V ′, E′)
= PredAdv(X ′1−C′ ⊕X ′C′ | V ′, E′)
= PredAdv(X ′1−C′ | V ′, E′) ≤ q .
We can, therefore, implement S-Reduce in the following way: We apply
ROTOR to all n instances of WOT, then use R-Reduce in the opposite
direction, and finally apply ROTOR to the resulting WOT. We get
Lemma 6.9. The protocolS-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm) securely imple-
ments (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT in the semi-honest model, where q′ = 1− (1− q)n ≤ nq,
p′ = pn ≤ e−n(1−p), and ε′ = (1− (1− 2ε)n)/2 ≤ nε.
Protocol E-Reduce(WOT‖n‖Comm) reduces the error ε, and is defined as
follows.
Protocol 7. E-ReduceA:
1. Receive (x0,i, x1,i) from the ith WOT, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
2. Receive dn−1 = (d0, . . . , dn−2) from Comm.
3. Send (sn−10 , s
n−1
1 ) = ((s0,0, . . . , s0,n−2), (s1,0, . . . , s1,n−2)) to Comm,
where sj,i := xdi⊕j,i ⊕ xj,n−1.
4. Output x0 := x0,n−1 and x1 := x1,n−1.
E-ReduceB:
1. Receive (ci, yi) from the ith WOT, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
2. Send dn−1 = (d0, . . . , dn−2) to Comm, where di := cn−1 ⊕ ci.
3. Receive (sn−10 , s
n−1
1 ) from Comm.
4. Output (c, y) := (cn−1,maj({yi})) where yi := yi ⊕ scn−1,i for i ∈
{0, . . . , n− 2} and yn−1 := yn−1.
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x0, x1
E-ReduceA E-ReduceB
c, y
sn−10 , s
n−1
1 s
n−1
0 , s
n−1
1
xn0 , x
n
1 c
n, yn
dn−1dn−1
WOT∅
Comm
Lemma 6.10. Protocol E-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm) securely imple-
ments (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT in the semi-honest model, where p′ = 1− (1−p)n ≤ np,
q′ = 1− (1− q)n ≤ nq and
ε′ =
n∑
i=⌈n/2⌉
(
n
i
)
εi(1− ε)n−i ≤ e−2n(1/2−ε)2 .
Proof. Let Ei := Yi ⊕XCi,i, and E := Y ⊕XC .
Let A = ∅. We have Pr[Ei = 1] ≤ ε. Since for i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 2}
Y i = Yi ⊕ SCn−1,i = Yi ⊕XDi⊕Cn−1,i ⊕XCn−1,n−1
= Yi ⊕XCi,i ⊕XC = Ei ⊕XC ,
it follows from Lemma A.10 that the protocol satisfies correctness with an
error of at most
ε′ =
n∑
i=⌈n/2⌉
(
n
i
)
εi(1− ε)n−i ≤ e−2n(1/2−ε)2 .
Let A = {B}. Let Vi be the auxiliary output to B from the ith instance
of WOT{B}. The auxiliary output to B is V = (Dn−1, Sn−10 , Sn−11 , V n).
Note that Dn−1 is a function of V n. Furthermore, Sn−1C is a function of
(V n, En), because
SC,i = XDi⊕Cn−1,i ⊕XCn−1,n−1 = XCi,i ⊕XCn−1,n−1
= Yi ⊕ Ei ⊕ Yn−1 ⊕ En−1 ,
for all i. Since
X1−C = X1−C,n−1 = S1−C,i ⊕X1−Di⊕C,i = S1−C,i ⊕X1−Ci,i ,
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Lemmas 2.7, 2.11 and A.9 imply
PredAdv(X1−C | V,E) ≤ PredAdv(X1−C | V n, En, Sn−11−C)
≤ 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1− PredAdv(X1−Ci,i | Vi, Ei))
≤ 1− (1− q)n ≤ nq .
Let A = {A}, and let Ui be the auxiliary output to A from the ith instance
of WOT{A}. The auxiliary output of the protocol to A is U := (Un, Dn−1).
Because E is a function of En, it follows from Lemmas 2.7, 2.11 and A.9
that
PredAdv(C | U,E) ≤ PredAdv(C | Un, En, Dn−1)
≤ 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1 − PredAdv(Ci | Ui, Ei))
≤ 1− (1 − p)n ≤ np .
6.3.2 In the Malicious Model
We will now show that the protocols R-Reduce and S-Reduce are also
secure in the malicious model, for the same parameters as in the semi-
honest model.
Lemma 6.11. ProtocolR-Reduce((p, q)-WOT‖n‖Comm) securely implements
(p′, q′)-WOT in the malicious model, where p′ = 1 − (1 − p)n ≤ np and
q′ = qn ≤ e−n(1−q).
Proof. Let A = ∅. It is easy to verify that X0, X1, and C are uniformly
distributed. Further, we have
Y =
n−1⊕
i=0
Yi =
n−1⊕
i=0
XCi,i =
n−1⊕
i=0
XDi⊕C,i = XC .
Hence, the protocol achieves correctness.
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Let A = {A}, and let Ui be the transcript of the interaction with player A
by the ith instance of WOT. The transcript of the interaction with A of the
protocol is U := (Un, Dn−1). From Lemma 2.11 and A.9 follows that
PredAdv(C | U) ≤ PredAdv(C | Un, Dn−1)
≤ 1−
n−1∏
i=0
(1 − PredAdv(Ci | Ui))
≤ 1− (1 − p)n ≤ np .
Let A = {B}, and let Vi be the transcript of the interaction with player
B by the ith instance of WOT. The transcript of the interaction with B of
the protocol is V := (V n, Dn−1). Note that since Dn−1 is a probabilistic
function of V it can be ignored. It follows from Lemmas 2.10 and A.4 that
PredAdv(X0 ⊕X1 | V ) ≤ PredAdv
(
n−1⊕
i=0
XDi⊕0,i ⊕
n−1⊕
i=0
XDi⊕1,i | V n
)
≤ PredAdv
(
n−1⊕
i=0
(X0,i ⊕X1,i) | V n
)
=
n−1∏
i=0
PredAdv(X0,i ⊕X1,i | Vi)
≤ qn ≤ e−n(1−q) .
The proof that ROTOR(WOT) implements WOT in the opposite direction
is very simple.
Lemma 6.12. ROTOR((p, q, ε)-WOT) implements (q, p, ε)-WOT in the oppo-
site direction, secure in the malicious model.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the correctness condition is satisfied. Fur-
thermore, we have
PredAdv(X0 ⊕X1 | U) = PredAdv(C′ | U) ≤ p
PredAdv(C | V ) = PredAdv(X ′0 ⊕X ′1 | V ) ≤ q .
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In the same way as in the passive case, we can implement S-Reduce by
first applying ROTOR to all n instances of WOT, then use R-Reduce in
the opposite direction, and by finally applying ROTOR. We get
Lemma 6.13. ProtocolS-Reduce((p, q)-WOT‖n‖Comm) securely implements
(p′, q′)-WOT in the semi-honest model, where q′ = 1 − (1 − q)n ≤ nq and
p′ = pn ≤ e−n(1−p).
6.4 WOT Amplification if ε = 0
We will now present several protocols that implement ROT from WOT.
We start with the special case where p, q > 0, but ε = 0. In [DKS99],
a protocol for this case is presented that works for all values p and q if
p+ q < 1, which is optimal. We present a slightly simplified protocol and
give a more detailed analysis of its efficiency.
The main part of the reduction is the following lemma, which shows that
we can implement a (p′, q′)-WOT out of 4 instances of (p, q)-WOT, where
the value 1− (1− p− q)2 is squared.
Lemma 6.14. Let f(p, q) := 1 − (1 − p − q)2, and let p + q < 1. We can
securely implement (p′, q′)-WOT out of 4 instances of (p, q)-WOT with
f(p′, q′) ≥ f2(p, q) ,
secure in the semi-honest and the malicious model.
Proof. It suffices to show that
1− p′ − q′ ≥
√
2− (1− p− q)2 · (1− p− q) ,
since then
f(p′, q′) = 1− (1− p′ − q′)2
≤ 1− (2− (1 − p− q)2)(1 − p− q)2
= f2(p, q) .
Twice, we apply either the protocol R-Reduce(WOT‖2‖Comm) or proto-
col S-Reduce(WOT‖2‖Comm), such that each time the larger of the two
parameter gets reduced.
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Since the protocols are symmetric, we can assume that p > q. Therefore,
the first protocol that will be applied is S-Reduce. We have to distinguish
between two cases. If p2 ≥ 1 − (1 − q)2 = 2q − q2, then also the second
protocol is S-Reduce, and, therefore,
p′ = p4, q′ = 1− (1 − q)4 .
Let
f1(p, q) :=
1− p′ − q′
1− p− q =
(1− q)4 − p4
1− p− q
= p3 + p2(1− q) + (1− q)2p+ (1 − q)3
and
g1(p, q) := f1(p, q)− (1 + p− q) = (p2 − 2q + q2)(1 + p− q) .
We will now show that f1(p, q) ≥
√
2− (1− p− q)2 if p2 ≥ 2q− q2. Since
for 0 < p < 1 and 0 < q < 1, we have 1 + p − q > 0. It follows that
g1(p, q) ≥ 0 for all p and q that satisfy p2 ≥ 2q − q2 and, therefore, also
f1(p, q) ≥ 1 + p− q
for all these values. Hence, it suffices to show that
1 + p− q ≥
√
2− (1− p− q)2
for p2 ≥ 2q − q2.
Let us fix the value d := 1 − p − q. We have 1 + p − q = 2p + d, and
thus 1 + p − q is minimal for p2 = 2q − q2. It is taken on by the values
q0 and p0 =
√
2q0 − q20 , which can be calculated by solving the equation√
2q0 − q20+q0 = 1−d, which is equal to 2q20−(4−2d)q0+(1−2d+d2) = 0.
We get
q0 =
(4− 2d)−√(4− 2d)2 − 4 · 2 · (1− 2d+ d2)
4
=
2− d−√2− d2
2
.
So, for p+ q = 1− d, we have
f1(p, q) ≥ 1 + (1− d− q0)− q0 = 2− d− (2− d−
√
2− d2) =
√
2− d2 .
78 Chapter 6. Weak Oblivious Transfer
If p2 < 2q − q2, the second protocol will be R-Reduce, and, therefore,
p′ = 1− (1− p2)2 = 2p2 − p4 ,
q′ = (1− (1 − q)2)2 = 4q2 − 4q3 + q4 .
Let
f2(p, q) :=
1− p′ − q′
1− p− q =
1− 2p2 + p4 − 4q2 + 4q3 − q4
1− p− q
= q3 − 3q2 − q2p+ q + 2qp+ qp2 + 1 + p− p2 − p3 .
We will now show that f2(p, q) ≥
√
2− d2 for p2 ≤ 2q + q2. Let
g2(p, q) := f2(p, q)− (1 + p− q) = (p2 − 2q + q2)(q − p− 1) ,
which is equal to 0 if p2 = 2q + q2. Therefore, we have
f2(p, q) = 1 + p− q = f1(p, q)
for all p and q that satisfy p2 = 2q+ q2. Again, let us fix d := 1− p− q and
let
h2(q) := f2(1− d− q, q)
= 4q3 − (12− 6d)q2 + (8− 12d+ 4d2)q + 4d− 4d2 + d3 .
We differentiate h2(q) twice, and get
h′2(q) = 12q
2 − (24− 12d)q + 8− 12d+ 4d2 ,
h′′2(q) = 24q − 24− 12d .
Since h′′2(q) ≤ 24q − 24 < 0 for q < 1, h2(q) is concave for 0 ≤ q ≤ 1
and p2 ≤ 2q + q2. It will therefore take on its minimum on a point on the
bound. One one side, we have p2 = 2q − q2, and therefore q0 (see above)
is the value on the bound, for which we have h2(q0) =
√
2− d2. On the
other side, q1 = (1 − d)/2 is the value on the bound, for which we have
h2((1− d)/2) = 3− d
2
2
.
For all d we have
3− d2
2
=
√
(d2 − 1)2
4
+ (2− d2) ≥
√
2− d2 ,
so the minimum is always in q0. Therefore, both f1(p, q) and f2(p, q) take
on their minimum in (1− d− q0, q0), and are always larger than
√
2− d2.
The statement follows.
6.5. WOT Amplification if p = 0 or q = 0 79
Theorem 6.2. Let p(k) and q(k) be functions computable in time poly(k) such
that p(k) + q(k) < 1 for all k. (2−k, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented
using
2 · k2
(1− p(k)− q(k))4
instances of (p, q)-WOT, secure in the semi-honest and the malicious model.
Proof. We apply t times Lemma 6.14, which gives us a (p′, q′)-WOT with
f(p′, q′) ≤ f (2t)(p, q). Using Lemmas A.4 and A.5, we get
p′ + q′ = 1−
√
1− f(p′, q′) ≤ 1−
√
1− f (2t)(p, q) ≤ f (2t)(p, q)
≤ exp(−2t(1− f(p, q))) = exp(−2t(1− p− q)2) .
To satisfy p′ + q′ ≤ 2−k, we choose
t :=
⌈
log
( − ln(2−k)
(1− p− q)2
)⌉
≤ log
(
ln(2) · k
(1− p− q)2
)
+ 1 .
Our protocol requires
4t ≤ 4 · ln
2(2) · k2
(1− p− q)4 ≤
2 · k2
(1− p− q)4
instances of (p, q)-WOT.
OT-Combiners. As shown in [HKN+05, MPW07], Theorem 6.2 can be
used to implement an efficient (α, β;n)-robust oblivious transfer combiner.
We have n different implementations of OT, out of which α are secure for
the sender, and β are secure for the receiver, where α + β > n. Choosing
randomly one of these n different implementations of OT and using ran-
dom inputs implements a (p, q)-WOT for p = (n−β)/n, and q = (n−α)/n.
Since 1 − p − q ≥ 1/n, we can implement a (2−k, 2−k)-WOT using 2k2n4
instances of the weak implementations of OT, and common randomness.
6.5 WOT Amplification if p = 0 or q = 0
We will now look at the special case where ε > 0, but either p = 0 or
q = 0. This special case has not been considered in [DKS99]. There is a
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strong connection of this problem to the one-way key-agreement problem
studied in [HR05, Hol06], as well as to the statistical-distance polarization
problem studied in [SV99, Vad99].
We will make the amplification in two steps. First, in Lemma 6.15 (which
is related to Lemma 4.13 in [Hol06]), we implement a WOT with constant
errors. In Lemma 6.16 (related to Lemma 4.1 in [SV99]), we show how the
error can be made arbitrarily small.
Lemma 6.15. Let q(k) and ε(k) be functions computable in time poly(k) such
that
√
q(k) + 2ε(k) < 1 for all k. Let
λ := max
(
1,
1
log ((1− 2ε)2/q)
)
.
Then (0, 1/3, 1/50)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using at most
128λ
(1− 2ε)(12λ)
instances of (0, q, ε)-WOT secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. Let α = 1 − 2ε and β = max(q, α2/2). Note that λ = 1/ log(α2/β).
We use
G = R-Reduce(F‖s‖Comm) ,
H = E-Reduce(G‖r‖Comm)
for s := ⌈5λ⌉ and r := ⌈1/(4βs)⌉. Notice that s < 5λ + 1 ≤ 6λ. Further,
since s > 5/ log(α2/β) > 5/ log(1/β) = logβ(1/32), we get
r <
1
4βs
+ 1 =
1 + 4βs
4βs
<
1 + 4/32
4βs
=
9
32βs
<
1
3βs
.
Using Lemmas 6.7 and 6.10, we get that G is a (0, β′, (1 − α′)/2)-WOT
with β′ = βs and α′ = αs, and H is a (0, q′′, ε′′)-WOT with
ε′′ ≤ exp
(
−2r
(
1
2
− 1− α
′
2
)2)
≤ exp
(
−rα
2s
2
)
≤ exp
(
−α
2s
8βs
)
= exp
(
−1
8
(
α2
β
)s)
≤ exp
(
−1
8
2
log(α2/β) 5
log(α2/β)
)
= exp (−32/8) < 1/50
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and, using that r < 1/(3βs), we get q′′ ≤ rβ′ ≤ rβs < 1/3.
Finally, the number of instances used is s · r, which is at most
6λ · 1
3β6λ
=
2λ
β6λ
=
128λ
α12λ
,
since 21/λ = α2/β and thus β6λ = α12λ/64.
Lemma 6.16. (0, 2−k, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using
116 · log(20k) · klog 3+1 = O (k2.6)
instances of (0, 1/3, 1/11)-WOT secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. Let β = 1/3, and α = 1− 2 · 1/11 = 9/11. Let ℓ = ⌈log(4k+4 log k)⌉
andm = 3ℓ/2. We use the reductions
G = R-Reduce(F‖ℓ‖Comm) ,
H = E-Reduce(G‖m‖Comm) ,
I = R-Reduce(H‖k‖Comm) .
Using Lemmas 6.7 and 6.10 and since F is a (0, β, (1− α)/2)-WOT, G is a
(0, β′, (1−α′)/2)-WOT, where β′ = βℓ and α′ = αℓ. H is a (0, β′′, ε′′)-WOT
with
β′′ ≤ mβ′ = 3ℓ/2 · (1/3)ℓ = 1/2
and, since 3 · α2 > 2,
ε′′ ≤ exp
(
−2m
(
1
2
− 1− α
′
2
)2)
= exp
(
−3ℓ · (α
ℓ)2
4
)
= exp
(
− (3 · α
2)ℓ
4
)
≤ exp
(
−2
ℓ
4
)
≤ exp (−k − log k) < 2−k−log k .
Finally, I is a (0, β′′′, ε′′′)-WOT with ε′′′ ≤ k2−k−log k = 2−k and β′′′ ≤ 2−k.
From Lemma A.4 follows that
4k + 4 log k = 4k + 4 ln(k)/ ln(2) ≤ 4k + (4k − 1)/ ln(2) ≤ 10k .
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The number of instances used is, using Lemma A.4,
ℓ ·m · k ≤ (log(4k + 4 log k) + 1) · 3log(4k+4 log k)+1 · k
≤ (log(10k) + 1) · 3 · (10k)log 3 · k
≤ 116 · log(20k) · klog 3+1 = O (k2.6) .
Combining Lemma 6.15 and Lemma 6.16, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3. Let q(k) and ε(k) be functions computable in time poly(k) such
that
√
q(k) + 2ε(k) < 1 for all k. Let
λ := max
(
1,
1
log ((1− 2ε)2/q)
)
.
(0, 2−k, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using at most
O
(
k2.6λ
(1 − 2ε)(12λ)
)
instances of (0, q, ε)-WOT secure in the semi-honest model.
Since R-Reduce and S-Reduce are symmetrical, we immediately get
Corollary 6.1. Let p(k) and ε(k) be functions computable in time poly(k) such
that
√
p(k) + 2ε(k) < 1 for all k. Let
λ := max
(
1,
1
log ((1 − 2ε)2/p)
)
.
(2−k, 0, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using at most
O
(
k2.6λ
(1 − 2ε)(12λ)
)
instances of (p, 0, ε)-WOT secure in the semi-honest model.
Since any protocol (using our basic protocols) for the special cases where
either p = 0 or q = 0 can directly be translated into a one-way key-
agreement protocol for distributions studied in [HR05], it follows from
Theorem 4 in [HR05] that using our basic protocols, this is the best bound
that we can achieve. However, it is not clear whether other reductions,
would be able to achieve a better bound.
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6.6 WOT Amplification if p, q, ε > 0.
To find an optimal protocol for the general case where all three parame-
ters are non-zero turns out to be much harder than the other three special
cases. It is still unknown what the exact bound is in this case. In this
section we present some partial results.
We start with the case where all values are non-zero, but smaller than
1/50.
Lemma 6.17. (2−k, 2−k, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using
175 · k2+log(3) ≤ 175 · k3.6
instances of (1/50, 1/50, 1/50)-WOT secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. We set F0 := (p, q, ε)-WOT and iterate the reduction
Fi+1 := S-Reduce(R-Reduce(E-Reduce(F‖3i ‖Comm)‖2‖Comm)‖2‖Comm) ,
untilFj is a (pj , qj , εj)-WOTwithmax(pj , qj , εj) ≤ 2−k. In every iteration,
we have pi+1 ≤ (2 · (3pi))2 = 36p2i , qi+1 ≤ 2 · ((3qi)2) = 18q2i , and εi+1 ≤
2 · 2 · (3ε2 − 2ε3) ≤ 12ε2, from which follows that
max(pj , qj , εj) ≤ 362
j−1 · 1
502j
=
1
36
(
36
50
)2j
≤
(
36
50
)2j
.
To achievemax(pj , qj , εj) ≤ 2−k, we choose
j :=
⌈
log
k
log(50/36)
⌉
≤ log(2.1101 · k) + 1 = log(4.2202 · k) .
To implement one instance of Fj , we need at most
12j ≤ (4.2202 · k)log(12) ≤ 175 · k2+log(3) ≤ 175 · k3.6
instances of F0.
We will now give a similar bound as in Lemma 5 in [DKS99], which was
p + q + 2ε ≤ 0.45. But since our protocol E-Reduce is different, we are
only able to achieve a smaller bound. As in [DKS99], we are only able
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to obtain our bound using a simulation. Our simulation works as fol-
lows: Let li(p, q) be a function such that for all p, q and ε < li(p, q),
(1/50, 1/50, 1/50)-WOT can be implemented using (p, q, ε)-WOT. Using
li(p, q), we define
li+1(p, q) := max(S
−1
ε (li(Sp(p), Sq(q))), R
−1
ε (li(Rp(p), Rq(q))),
E−1ε (li(Ep(p), Eq(q)))) ,
where
Sp(p) := p
2 , Sq(q) := 1− (1− q)2 , S−1ε (ε) := (1−
√
1− 2ε)/2 ,
Rp(p) := 1− (1− p)2 , Rq(q) := q2 , R−1ε (ε) := (1−
√
1− 2ε)/2 ,
Ep(p) := 1− (1 − p)3 , Eq(q) := 1− (1− q)3 ,
and E−1ε (ε) is the inverse of Eε(ε) := 3ε
2 − 2ε3.
Now, for all p, q and ε < li+1(p, q), (1/50, 1/50, 1/50)-WOT can be im-
plemented using (p, q, ε)-WOT, since applying one of the three protocols
S-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖2‖Comm), R-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖2‖Comm), or
E-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖3‖Comm)) gives us an instance of (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT
with ε′ < li(p
′, q′), from which (1/50, 1/50, 1/50)-WOT can be imple-
mented.
Obviously, l0(p, q) := (0.02 − p − q)/2 satisfies our condition. Iterating 8
times, we get l8(p, q), where for all p, q we have l8(p, q) ≥ (0.15− p− q)/2.
Using l′0(p, q) := (0.15 − p − q)/2 and iterating 11 times, we get l′11(p, q),
were for all p, q we have l′11(p, q) ≥ (0.24− p− q)/2 (See also Figure 6.2).
Lemma 6.18. If p+q+2ε ≤ 0.24, then (1/50, 1/50, 1/50)-WOT can efficiently
be implemented usingO(1) instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT, secure in the semi-honest
model.
We will now further extend this result and give bounds for the cases
where one of the three values is large, while the others are small.
Lemma 6.19. If p+22q+44ε < 1, then (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT with p′ + q′ + 2ε′ ≤
0.24 can efficiently be implemented using 4/(1− p) instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT,
secure in the semi-honest model.
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ε = l′11(p, q)
p+ q + 2ε = 0.24
p q
ε
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1 0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Figure 6.2: Plot of the bounds ε = l′11(p, q) and p+ q + 2ε = 0.24.
Proof. We apply
F = S-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm)
for an n > 0 such that F is a (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT with p′ + q′ + 2ε′ ≤ 0.24.
Using Lemma 6.9, we need to find a value n and constants α and β with
α+β ≤ 0.24, such that e−n(1−p) ≤ α and nq+2nε ≤ β, which is equivalent
to n(1− p) ≥ ln(1/α) and q + 2ε ≤ β/n. We can choose
n :=
⌈
ln(1/α)
1− p
⌉
≤ ln(1/α)
1− p + 1 ≤
ln(1/α) + 1
1− p .
The first inequality is satisfied by definition of n, and the second if
q + 2ε ≤ β(1 − p)
ln(1/α) + 1
,
which is equivalent to
ln(1/α) + 1
β
(q + 2ε) + p ≤ 1 .
Choosing α = 0.05, and β = 0.19, we get (ln(1/α) + 1)/β ≤ 22. Our
protocol needs n ≤ 4/(1− p) instances.
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In the same way, we get
Lemma 6.20. If 22p+ q+44ε < 1, then (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT with p′ + q′ + 2ε′ ≤
0.24 can efficiently be implemented using 4/(1− q) instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT,
secure in the semi-honest model.
The proof of Lemma 6.20 is omitted, as it can be done in the same way as
the proof of Lemma 6.19.
Lemma 6.21. If 7
√
p+ q + 2ε < 1, then (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT with p′ + q′ +
2ε′ ≤ 0.24 can efficiently be implemented using 3(1/2 − ε)−2 instances of
(p, q, ε)-WOT, secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. We apply
F = E-Reduce((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm)
for an n > 0 such that F is a (p′, q′, ε′)-WOT with p′ + q′ + 2ε′ ≤ 0.24.
Using Lemma 6.10, we need to find a value n and constants α and β with
2α + β ≤ 0.24, such that e−2n(1/2−ε)2 ≤ α and np + nq ≤ β, which is
equivalent to 2n(1/2− ε)2 ≥ ln(1/α) and p + q ≤ β/n. Furthermore, we
need ε < 12 . We choose
n :=
⌈
ln(1/α)
2(1/2− ε)2
⌉
≤ ln(1/α)
2(1/2− ε)2 + 1 ≤
ln(1/α) + 1/2
2(1/2− ε)2 .
The last inequality follows from the fact that 2(1/2− ε)2 ≤ 1/2. The first
inequality is satisfied by definition of n, and the second if
p+ q ≤ 2β(1/2− ε)
2
ln(1/α) + 1/2
,
which is equivalent to√
2 ln(1/α) + 1
β
√
p+ q + 2ε < 1 .
Choosing α = 0.02 and β = 0.20, we get√
2 ln(1/α) + 1
β
≤ 7 .
Our protocol needs n ≤ 3(1/2− ε)−2 instances.
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Theorem 6.4 summarizes all the partial results we obtained in this section.
Theorem 6.4. Let p(k), q(k) and ε(k) be functions computable in time poly(k)
such that
p+ q + 2ε ≤ 0.24 ,
or
min(p+ 22q + 44ε, 22p+ q + 44ε, 7
√
p+ q + 2ε) < 1
for all k. Then (2−k, 2−k, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using
O
(
k3.6
(1 − p)(1− q)(1/2− ε)2
)
instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemmas 6.18, 6.19, 6.20, and 6.21.
Since Theorem 6.2 gives us a bound on the number of instances used, we
can also bound the error probability, and therefore, we can extend the
result of Theorem 6.2 to allow for a (small) error.
Corollary 6.2. Let p(k), q(k) and ε(k) be functions computable in time poly(k)
such that
(1− p− q)4 < −178 · log(1− 2ε)
for all k. Then (2−k, 2−k, 2−k)-WOT can efficiently be implemented using
O
(
k3.6
(1− p− q)4
)
instances of (p, q, ε)-WOT, secure in the semi-honest model.
Proof. We apply the reduction used in Theorem 6.2 for k = 5. We get
p′ ≤ 2−5, q′ ≤ 2−5, and ε′ ≤ (1 − (1 − 2ε)n)/2, for n = 50 · (1 − p− q)−4.
We have
log(1− 2ε′) = n log(1 − 2ε) = 50 · (1− p− q)−4 · (1− p− q)4/−178
= −50/178
and therefore
p′ + q′ + 2ε′ ≤ 2 · 2−5 + (1 − 2−50/178) < 0.24 .
The statement follows now by applying Lemmas 6.17 and 6.18.
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6.7 Discussion and Open Problems
We have presented several protocols that implement ROT from many in-
stances of WOT. For the special case where ε = 0, we were able to achieve
the optimal bound, and when either p = 0 or q = 0, we were at least able
to give protocols which achieve the optimal bound for the basic protocols
that we use.
However, for the general case, we still do not have very satisfactory re-
sults. One of the main difficulties is that we do not know exactly which
of the basic protocols needs to be applied in which situation. To be able
to do that, we would need a better understanding of how these protocols
work together.
There are still many open problems concerning WOT amplification. Here
are some of them:
• Can we improve the impossibility bound?
• Forwhat parameters ofWOT canwe implement ROTwith our basic
protocols? How many instances do we need?
• Are there other basic protocols that give better bounds? Is it pos-
sible to use (a modified version of) the protocol E-Reduce from
[DKS99]? Is it possible to reduce two parameters at the same time?
• Is there a (simple) way to make E-Reduce secure in the malicious
model?
• Can GWOT be used to improve WOT amplification?
• Is it possible to define WOT in another, more general way?
• How do we have to define WOT in a multi-party setting?
Chapter 7
Computational Weak
Oblivious Transfer
In this chapter we show how an OT which may contain errors and which
is only mildly computationally secure for the two players can be amplified
to a computationally-secure OT. In particular, we show in Theorem 7.2
— using Holenstein’s uniform hard-core lemma [Hol05, Hol06], which is
a uniform variant of Impagliazzo’s hard-core lemma [Imp95] — that if
WOT can be amplified to ROT in the information-theoretic setting, then
also the corresponding computational version of WOT can be amplified
to a computationally-secure ROT, using the same protocol.
Our results generalize the results presented in [Hai04], as we cover a
much larger region for the values p, q and ε, and in our case the secu-
rity for both players may be computational.
7.1 Preliminaries
In the following, k ∈ N is always the the security parameter. We say that
a function f : N → N is polynomial in k, denoted by poly(k), if there exist
constants c > 0 and k0, such that f(k) ≤ kc for all k ≥ k0. A function
f : N → [0, 1] is negligible in k, denoted by negl(k), if for all constant c > 0
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there exists a constant k0, such that f(k) ≤ k−c for all k ≥ k0. A function
f : N → [0, 1] is noticeable if there exit constants c > 0 and k0 such that
f(k) ≥ k−c for all k ≥ k0. An algorithm B which has oracle access to an
algorithm Awill be denoted by BA.
We will need the following lemmas, which are, when put together, the
computational version of Lemma 2.6.
Lemma 7.1. Let functions f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ, P : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, and
a distribution PW over {0, 1}k be given. There is an oracle algorithm B(·) such
that, for any algorithm A where
Pr[A(f(W ), P (W )) = 1]− Pr[A(f(W ), U) = 1] = ε ,
where W is distributed according to PW and U is uniformly distributed, algo-
rithm BA satisfies
Pr[BA(f(W )) = P (W )] =
1
2
+ ε ,
does one oracle call to A, and computes one XOR.
Proof. On input f(w), let algorithm BA choose a bit u uniformly at ran-
dom and output A(f(w), u)⊕ u⊕ 1. Let
g(w, u) := Pr[A(f(w), u) = 1] .
The output of BA is correct either if U = P (W ) and the output of A is 1,
or U 6= P (W ) and the output of A is 0. We get
Pr[BA(f(W )) = P (W )]
=
∑
w
PW (w)
(
g(w,P (w))
2
+
1− g(w, 1− P (w))
2
)
=
1
2
+
∑
w
PW (w)
g(w,P (w)) − g(w, 1− P (w))
2
=
1
2
+
∑
w
PW (w)
(
g(w,P (w)) − g(w,P (w)) − g(w, 1− P (w))
2
)
=
1
2
+ Pr[A(f(W ), P (W )) = 1]− Pr[A(f(W ), U) = 1]
=
1
2
+ AdvA(f(W ), P (W )), (f(W ), U) .
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Lemma 7.2. Let functions f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ, P : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, and
a distribution PW over {0, 1}k be given. There is an oracle algorithm A(·) such
that, for any algorithm B where
Pr[B(f(W )) = P (W )] =
1
2
+ ε ,
we have
AdvA
B
(f(W ), P (W )), (f(W ), U) = ε ,
where W is distributed according to PW and U is uniformly distributed, does
one oracle call to A, and computes one XOR.
Proof. On input (f(w), b), let Algorithm A output B(f(w)) ⊕ b ⊕ 1. If b
is a uniform random bit, than we have Pr[AB(f(w), b) = 1] = 1/2, and
if b = P (w), then Pr[AB(f(w), b) = 1] = 1/2 + ε. Therefore, we have
AdvA
B
((f(W ), P (W )), (f(W ), U)) = ε.
7.2 Pseudo-Randomness Extraction
In this section we state a pseudo-randomness extraction theorem, Theorem
7.1, that we need later to prove our main theorem of this chapter, The-
orem 7.2. Theorem 7.1 is based on the uniform hard-core lemma [Hol05,
Hol06], which is a uniform variant of the hard-core lemma from [Imp95].
Lemma 7.3 (Uniform hard-core lemma [Hol05, Hol06]). Let the functions
f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ, P : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, δ : N → [0, 1] and γ : N → [0, 1]
computable in time poly(k) be given, such that γ and δ are noticeable. Assume
that there is no polynomial time algorithm B such that
Pr[B(f(W )) = P (W )] ≥ 1− δ
2
+
γ2δ5
8192
,
where W is chosen uniformly at random from {0, 1}k, for infinitely many k.
Then, there is no polynomial time oracle algorithm A(·)1 such that for infinitely
many k the following holds: For any set S ⊆ {0, 1}k with |S| ≥ δ2k,
Pr[AχS (f(W )) = P (W )] ≥ 1 + γ
2
,
1A(·) has oracle access to the characteristic function χS of the set S , which is defined as
χS(w) := 1 if w ∈ S and χS(w) := 0 otherwise.
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where W is chosen uniformly at random from S and the queries of A to χS are
computed independently of the input f(W ).
Theorem 7.1 is a modified version of Theorem 7.3 in [Hol06] and differs
from it in two points. First, we simplified it by omitting the function q(w)
that indicates whether w is valid, because in our setting all w are valid.
Second, we allow the functions Ext and Leak to depend on the value Zn,
and not only onXn. The proof of Theorem 7.1 is basically the same as the
proof of Theorem 7.3 in [Hol06]. Notice that in the proof of Theorem 7.3
in [Hol06] there is a step missing before equation (7.8), which is fixed in
our proof.
The main difference of Theorem 7.3 in [Hol06] and our Theorem 7.1 com-
pared to the (implicit) extraction lemma in [Ha˚s90, HILL99] and the ex-
traction lemma in [HHR06] is that it allows the adversary to gain some
additional knowledge during the extraction, expressed by the function
Leak.
Theorem 7.1 (Pseudo-randomness extraction theorem, [Hol06]). Let the
functions f : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ, P : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}, and β : N → [0, 1], all
computable in time poly(k), be given, and let 1 − β(k) be noticeable. Assume
that every polynomial time algorithm B satisfies
Pr[B(f(W )) = P (W )] ≤ 1 + β(k)
2
for all but finitely many k, for a uniform randomW ∈ {0, 1}k. Further, let also
functions n(k), s(k),
Ext : {0, 1}ℓ·n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}t ,
Leak : {0, 1}ℓ·n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}s → {0, 1}t′ ,
be given which are computable in time poly(k), and satisfy the following: For
any distribution PXZ over {0, 1} × {0, 1}ℓ where PredAdv(X | Z) ≤ β(k),
Ext(Zn, Xn, R) is ε(k)-close to uniform with respect to Leak(Zn, Xn, R), for
R ∈ {0, 1}s chosen uniformly at random. Then, no polynomial time algorithm
A, which gets as input
Leak((f(W0), . . . , f(Wn−1)), (P (W0), . . . , P (Wn−1)), R) ,
(where (W1, . . . ,Wn) is chosen uniformly at random) distinguishes
Ext((f(W0), . . . , f(Wn−1)), (P (W0), . . . , P (Wn−1)), R)
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from a uniform random string of length t with advantage ε(k) + γ(k), for any
non-negligible function γ(k).
Proof. Let us assume there exists an algorithm A that contradicts our as-
sumption. We will use A to construct an oracle algorithm A
χS
for which
the following holds for infinitely many k for a noticeable function γ′. For
any set S ⊆ {0, 1}k with |S| ≥ (1− β(k))2k , we have
Pr[A
χS
(f(W )) = P (W )] ≥ 1 + γ
′
2
,
where the probability is over the randomness of A
χS
, W is chosen uni-
formly at random from {0, 1}k, and AχS calls χS only with queries which
are computed independently of the input.
Since γ(k) is non-negligible, there exists a constant c, such that γ(k) ≥ k−c
for infinitely many k. Let γ∗(k) := k−c. γ∗(k) is a noticeable function with
γ∗(k) ≤ γ(k) for infinitely many k.
For any fixed j ∈ {0, . . . , n} and any fixed set S ⊆ {0, 1}k with |S| ≥
(1 − β)2k, we define the following values. For all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1},
we choose wi ∈ {0, 1}k and ui ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random. Then we
compute
yi :=
{
P (wi) if i ≥ j or wi 6∈ S ,
ui otherwise ,
(7.1)
ej := Ext((f(w1), . . . , f(wn)), y
n, r) , and (7.2)
ℓj := Leak((f(w1), . . . , f(wn)), y
n, r) , (7.3)
where r ∈ {0, 1}s is chosen uniformly at random.
LetPEjLj be the distribution of (ej , ℓj). From our assumption follows that
AdvA((E0, L0), (U,L0)) ≥ ε+ γ∗
for infinitely many k, where U ∈ {0, 1}t is chosen uniformly at random.
On the other hand, for j = n, with probability 1 − β (over the choice of
wi) we have yi = ui, and therefore, by Lemma 2.8, PredAdv(Yi | f(Wi)) ≤
β. The information-theoretic requirement on the functions Ext and Leak
imply that En is ε-close to uniform with respect to Ln and therefore
AdvA((En, Ln), (U,Ln)) ≤ ε .
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The triangle inequality implies
AdvA((E0, L0), (En, Ln)) + Adv
A((U,L0), (U,Ln)) ≥ γ∗
for infinitely many k. It follows that at least one of the four inequalities
Pr[A(E0, L0) = 1] − Pr[A(En, Ln) = 1] ≥ γ∗/2, Pr[A(En, Ln) = 1] −
Pr[A(E0, L0) = 1] ≥ γ∗/2, Pr[A(U,L0) = 1]−Pr[A(U,Ln) = 1] ≥ γ∗/2, or
Pr[A(U,Ln) = 1] − Pr[A(U,L0) = 1] ≥ γ∗/2 holds for infinitely many k,
from which follows that there exists an algorithm A′ such that
Pr[A′(E0, L0) = 1]− Pr[A′(En, Ln) = 1] ≥ γ
∗
2
for infinitely many k. For a J ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} chosen uniformly at ran-
dom, we have
Pr[A′(EJ , LJ) = 1]− Pr[A′(EJ+1, LJ+1) = 1] ≥ γ
∗
2n
for infinitely many k. We can now give an implementation of a distin-
guisher which distinguishes (f(W ), P (W )) from (f(W ), U) with advan-
tage γ∗/(2n) for infinitely many k, if W is chosen uniformly from S and
U is a uniform random bit, as long as oracle access to χS is given. Let
(f(w), b) be the input to the distinguisher. It chooses j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1},
and for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} the values wi ∈ {0, 1}k and ui ∈ {0, 1} uni-
formly at random. Then, for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}, it computes the values
f(wi), P (wi) and yi as in (7.1). If wj ∈ S, it replaces f(wj) with f(w) and
yi with b. Then, it computes ej and ℓj as in (7.2) and (7.3). If b is a uniform
bit, then this process gives random variables (Ej , Lj) distributed accord-
ing to PEj+1Lj+1 , otherwise it gives random variables distributed accord-
ing to PEjLj . Therefore, A
′ distinguishes (f(W ), P (W )) from (f(W ), U)
with advantage γ∗/(2n) for infinitely many k, if W is chosen uniformly
at random from S. From Lemma 7.1 follows that there exists a polyno-
mial time algorithm that predicts P (W ) from f(W ), where W is chosen
uniformly at random from S, with probability at least 1/2 + γ∗/(2n) for
infinitely many k. We can now apply Lemma 7.3 for γ := γ∗/n and
δ := 1− β to obtain the statement.
7.3 Definition of Computational WOT
In order to define security in the computational setting, i.e., where the
running time of the adversary is bounded by a polynomial, we need to
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introduce a security parameter k on which the players agree beforehand.
We consider the uniform model, that is, we require the same protocols to
run on all security parameters, which they get as a separate input. Ad-
ditionally, we require the security parameter to be larger than the sum
of the length of all the inputs and outputs of the protocol. The security
in the computational semi-honest model is very similar to the (information-
theoretic) semi-honest model (Definition 3.3). The only differences are
that we require the distinguishers to be efficient, i.e., to run in time poly(k),
and we require the advantage of these distinguishers to be negligible in
k. Furthermore, we require that the simulator is efficient, i.e., runs in time
poly(k).
We say that X(k) and Y (k) are computationally indistinguishable, denoted
by X
c≡ Y , if AdvD(X,Y ) ≤ negl(k), where D is the set of all distinguish-
ers that run in time poly(k).
Definition 7.1. A protocol P(F) = (PA‖PB)(F) securely implements G in
the computational semi-honest model, if
• (Correctness) P(F∅) c≡ G∅ .
• (Security for A) There exists a system SB (called the simulator for B),
that runs in time poly(k) and only modifies the auxiliary interfaces,
such that
(PA‖PB)(F{bB})
c≡ SB(G{bB}) .
• (Security for B) There exists a system SA (called the simulator for A),
that runs in time poly(k) and only modifies the auxiliary interfaces,
such that
(PA‖PB)(F{bA})
c≡ SA(G{bA}) .
The primitive (p, q, ε)-compWOT denotes the computational version of
(p, q, ε)-WOT. The difference to the definition of WOT is that we require
the algorithm that guesses X1−C or C to be efficient.
Definition 7.2 (Computational WOT, semi-honest model). Let functions
ε : N → [0, 1/2], p : N → [0, 1], and q : N → [0, 1] computable in time
poly(k) be given. Let F = (F∅,F{bA},F{bB}) be a collection of systems in
the computational semi-honest model. On input k, F outputs (X0, X1)
to A and (C, Y ) to B. Let U be the auxiliary output to A by F
{bA} and V
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be the auxiliary output to B by F
{bB}. Let E := XC ⊕ Y . F implements
(p(k), q(k), ε(k))-compWOT in the computational semi-honest model, if
• (Efficiency) F can be executed in time poly(k).
• (Correctness) Pr[E = 1] ≤ ε(k) for all k.
• (Security for A) All polynomial time algorithms A satisfy
Pr[A(V,E) = X1−C ] ≤ 1 + q(k)
2
for all but finitely many k.
• (Security for B) All polynomial time algorithms A satisfy
Pr[A(U,E) = C] ≤ 1 + p(k)
2
for all but finitely many k.
Lemma 7.4 is the computational version of Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 7.4. A collection of systems F that securely implements
(negl(k), negl(k), negl(k))-compWOT
also securely implements
(
2
1
)
-ROT1 in the computational semi-honest model.
Proof. From the (computational) security conditions for A follows that C
is (statistically) negl(k)-close to uniform with respect to (X0, X1). Other-
wise, it could easily and efficiently be distinguished from uniform. Sim-
ilarly, it follows from the security condition for B that X1−C is negl(k)-
close to uniform with respect to (C,XC). From Lemma 6.1 follows that
(C,X0, X1) is negl(k)-close to uniform. Together with the correctness con-
dition, we get
F∅ ≡negl(k) ROT∅ .
Let F{B} produce the output distribution PX0X1CY V , and let PX0X1CY be
the output distribution of ROT. We define SB as follows. After receiving
(c, y) from ROT, it simulates F{B}, which outputs (c′, y′, v′), until c′ = b
and y′ = y. It outputs v′.
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From the correctness condition follows that (C′, Y ′) is negl(k)-close to
uniform, and, therefore, the probability C′ = c and Y ′ = y is at least
1/4 − negl(k). The expected number of iterations2 is therefore constant
and the simulator is efficient since the system F is efficient.
Let us assume that there exists an algorithm Awith
AdvA(X0X1CY V ,X0X1CY V
′) ≥ γ(k) ,
for a non-negligible function γ(k). There exists a constant c, such that
γ(k) ≥ k−c for infinitely many k. Let γ∗(k) := k−c. γ∗(k) is a noticeable
function with γ∗(k) ≤ γ(k) for infinitely many k.
Since (C,XC , Y, V ) is negl(k)-close to (C,XC , Y , V
′), and X1−C is uni-
form with respect to (C,XC , Y , V
′), we have
AdvA(RCXCY V ,X1−CCXCY V
′) ≤ negl(k) ,
where R is chosen uniformly at random. It follows that
AdvA(RCXCY V,X1−CCXCY V ) ≥ γ∗(k)− negl(k)
for infinitely many k, and therefore either
Pr[A(RCXCY V ) = 1]− Pr[A(X1−CCXCY V ) = 1] ≥ γ∗(k)− negl(k)
for infinitely many k, or
Pr[A(X1−CCXCY V ) = 1]− Pr[A(RCXCY V ) = 1] ≥ γ∗(k)− negl(k)
for infinitely many k. Note that (C, Y ) is a function of V andE = XC⊕Y .
In both cases, it follows from Lemma 7.1 that there exists an algorithm
that can predictX1−C with probability 1/2+ γ
∗(k)−negl(k) for infinitely
many k, which contradicts our assumption that no such algorithm exists.
The proof for the security of B can be done the same way.
7.4 Computational-WOT Amplification
In [Hol05], Lemma 7.3 was used to show that any information-theoretic
key-agreement protocol can also be used in the computational setting.
2If we want the algorithm to be worst-case polynomial, we simply abort after a polyno-
mial amount of simulations.
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We will use a very similar proof to show that any protocol that efficiently
implements ROT out of many instances of WOT in the semi-honest model
can be used to implement ROT out of many instances of compWOT in the
computational semi-honest model.
Theorem 7.2. Let the functions ε(k), p(k), q(k) and n(k) computable in time
poly(k) be given. Let a protocol P(Comm) achieve (p, q, ε)-compWOT. Fur-
ther, let an efficient protocol Q((p, q, ε)-WOT‖n‖Comm) be given which takes
k as input and securely implements (negl(k), negl(k), negl(k))-WOT in the
semi-honest model. Then the protocol3 Q(P(Comm)‖n‖Comm) implements
(negl(k), negl(k), negl(k))-compWOT in the computational semi-honest model.
Proof. Let W = (WA,WB) be the randomness used in P(Comm) by the
sender and the receiver, and let Z be the communication. The honest
protocols PA and PB output (X0, X1) and (C, Y ), respectively, while the
semi-honest protocols PA andPB additionally have the auxiliary outputs
U = (X0, X1, Z,WA) and V = (C, Y, Z,WB), respectively. Let E := Y ⊕
XC . All these values are functions ofW .
QA receives (X
n
0 , X
n
1 ) from P(Comm)‖n and outputs (X∗0 , X∗1 ). QB re-
ceives (Cn, Y n) fromP(Comm)‖n and outputs (C∗, Y ∗). LetR = (RA, RB)
be the randomness used in Q by both players, and let Z ′ be the commu-
nication sent over Comm in Q. Let E∗ := Y ∗ ⊕X∗C∗ . The values E∗, X∗0 ,
X∗1 , C
∗, Y ∗ and Z ′ are functions of (Xn0 , X
n
1 , C
n, Y n, R).
First of all, the resulting protocol Q(P(Comm)‖n‖Comm) will be correct
and efficient, as every outcome of P(Comm) satisfies Pr[Y 6= XC ] ≤ ε.
For the security for A, we define the following functions: let f(W ) :=
(V,E) and P (W ) := X1−C . Since XC = E ⊕ Y , it is possible to simulate
the protocol Q using the values (V,E)n, (X1−C)
n, and R. Therefore, we
can define
Ext((V,E)n, (X1−C)
n, R) := X∗1−C∗
and
Leak((V,E)n, (X1−C)
n, R) := (E∗, C∗, Y ∗, V n, Z ′, RB) .
Q implements (negl(k), negl(k), negl(k))-WOT. It follows from Lemma 7.2
that the functions Ext and Leak satisfy the extraction requirements from
3This is an execution of Q, where all calls to WOT are replaced by independent execu-
tions of P.
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Theorem 7.1 with ε(k) = negl(k). Furthermore, Ext and Leak can be com-
puted efficiently, since the protocol Q is efficient. From the security con-
dition of compWOT follows that every polynomial-time algorithm B sat-
isfies
Pr[B(f(W )) = P (W )] = Pr[B(V,E) = X1−C ] ≤ 1 + q(k)
2
for all but finitely many k, for W chosen uniformly at random. Theo-
rem 7.1 tells us that no polynomial time algorithm A, which gets as input
Leak((V,E)n, (X1−C)
n, R) distinguishes Ext((V,E)n, (X1−C)
n, R) from a
uniform random bit with advantage negl(k)+γ(k), for any non-negligible
function γ(k). The security for A follows now from Lemma 7.2.
For the security for B, we define the following functions: let f(W ) :=
(U,E) and P (W ) := C. Since XC = E ⊕ Y , it is possible to simulate the
protocol Q using the values (U,E)n, Cn, and R. Therefore, we can define
Ext((U,E)n, Cn, R) := C∗ ,
and
Leak((U,E)n, Cn, R) := (E∗, X∗0 , X
∗
1 , U
n, Z ′, RA) .
Q implements (negl(k), negl(k), negl(k))-WOT. It follows from Lemma 7.2
that the functions Ext and Leak satisfy the extraction requirements from
Theorem 7.1 with ε(k) = negl(k). Furthermore, Ext and Leak can be com-
puted efficiently, since the protocol Q is efficient. From the security con-
dition of compWOT follows that every polynomial time algorithm A sat-
isfies
Pr[A(f(W )) = P (W )] = Pr[A(U,E) = C] ≤ 1 + p(k)
2
for all but finitely many k, for W chosen uniformly at random. The-
orem 7.1 tells us that no polynomial time algorithm B, which gets as
input Leak((U,E)n, Cn, R) distinguishes Ext((U,E)n, Cn, R) from a uni-
form random bit with advantage negl(k) + γ(k), for any non-negligible
function γ(k). The security for B follows now from Lemma 7.2.
Together with the information-theoretic reductions presented in Chapters
4 and 6, we get a protocol that securely amplifies (p, q, ε)-compWOT to(
1
2
)
-OT1 in the computational semi-honest model.
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Corollary 7.1. Let the functions ε(k), p(k), and q(k), computable in time
poly(k), be given, where either for all k
ε = 0 ∧ p+ q < 1− 1/ poly(k) ,
p+ q + 2ε ≤ 0.24 ,
or
min(p+ 22q + 44ε, 22p+ q + 44ε, 7
√
p+ q + 2ε) < 1− 1/ poly(k) ,
or, for constant functions p(k), q(k) and ε(k),
p = 0 ∧ √q + 2ε < 1 ,
q = 0 ∧ √p+ 2ε < 1 ,
or
(1− p− q)4 < −178 · log(1− 2ε) .
If there exists a protocolP(Comm) that securely implements (p, q, ε)-compWOT
in the computational semi-honest model, then there exists a protocol Q(Comm)
that implements
(
1
2
)
-OT1 in the computational semi-honest model.
7.5 Discussion and Open Problems
We have shown that Holenstein’s hard-core lemma [Hol05, Hol06] can
also be applied in the setting of two-party computation, and presented a
new computational assumption, namely computational weak oblivious trans-
fer, under which oblivious transfer and hence any two-party computation
is possible in a computationally secure way.
The pseudo-randomness extraction theorem presented in [Hol06] turned out
not to be general enough for our application. It would be interesting to
know whether our generalization is also useful in other applications.
A very interesting open problem is whether our results can be used to
improve the results from [Hai04], i.e., whether it is possible to implement
computationally-secure OT from weaker requirements on trapdoor per-
mutations.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Formal Technicalities
LemmaA.1 (Chernoff/Hoeffding Bound [Che52, Hoe63]). Let PX0...Xn =
PnX be a product distribution with Xi ∈ [0, 1]. Let X := 1n
∑n−1
i=0 Xi, and
µ = E[X ]. Then, for any ε > 0,
Pr [X ≥ µ+ ε] ≤ e−2nε2 ,
Pr [X ≤ µ− ε] ≤ e−2nε2 .
Lemma A.2 (Cauchy-Schwartz). For all x0, . . . , xn−1, y0, . . . , yn−1 ∈ R, we
have (
n−1∑
i=0
xiyi
)2
≤
(
n−1∑
i=0
x2i
)
·
(
n−1∑
i=0
y2i
)
.
Lemma A.3. For all a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ R, we have(
n−1∑
i=0
ai
)2
≤ n ·
n−1∑
i=0
a2i .
Proof. The statement follows fromLemmaA.2, choosing xi := 1 and yi :=
ai.
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Lemma A.4. For all x ∈ R, we have ln(x+ 1) ≤ x ≤ ex−1.
Proof sketch. The function ln(x+1) is convex, and goes through the point
(0, 0)with slope 1, and the function ex−1 is concave, and goes through the
point (1, 1)with slope 1. Hence, we have ln(x+ 1) ≤ x ≤ ex−1.
Lemma A.5. For 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we have 1−√1− x ≤ x.
Proof. From (1 − x)2 ≤ 1 − x follows that 1 − x ≤ √1− x, and hence
1−√1− x ≤ x.
Lemma A.6. For all x, y ∈ R, we have∣∣∣∣x− x+ y2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣y − x+ y2
∣∣∣∣ = |x− y|
Proof. If x ≥ y, we have∣∣∣∣x− x+ y2
∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣y − x+ y2
∣∣∣∣ = x− x+ y2 + x+ y2 − y = x− y = |x− y| .
The same holds for y > x.
Lemma A.7. LetX0 andX1 be two independent binary random variables with
Pr[X0 = 1] ≤ (1 − α0)/2 and Pr[X1 = 1] ≤ (1 − α1)/2, where α0, α1 ≥ 0.
Then Pr[X0 ⊕X1 = 1] ≤ (1− α0α1)/2.
Proof. For Pr[X0 = 1] = (1−α′0)/2 and Pr[X1 = 1] = (1−α′1)/2, we have
Pr[X0 ⊕X1 = 1] = 1 + α
′
0
2
· 1− α
′
1
2
+
1− α′0
2
· 1 + α
′
1
2
=
1− α′0α′1
2
.
The lemma follows from the fact that
1− α′0α′1
2
≥ 1− α0α1
2
for all α′0 ∈ [α0, 1] and α′1 ∈ [α1, 1].
Lemma A.8. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let Xi be independent binary random
variables where Pr[Xi = 1] ≤ α, for α ≤ 1/2. Then
Pr[X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xn−1 = 1] ≤ 1− (1 − 2α)
n
2
≤ nα .
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Proof. The first inequality follows by induction from Lemma A.7, and the
second by the union bound, since
Pr[X0 ⊕ · · · ⊕Xn−1 = 1] ≤ Pr[∃i : Xi = 1] ≤ nα .
Lemma A.9. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let Xi ∈ {0, 1} be independently dis-
tributed with Pr[Xi = 1] ≤ α. We have
Pr[X0 = 1 ∨ · · · ∨Xn−1 = 1] ≤ 1− (1− α)n ≤ nα.
Proof. Follows directly from the union bound.
Lemma A.10. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, let Xi ∈ {0, 1} be independently dis-
tributed with Pr[Xi = 1] ≤ α. We have
Pr
[
n−1∑
i=0
Xi ≥ n/2
]
≤
n∑
i=⌈n/2⌉
(
n
i
)
αi(1 − α)n−i ≤ e−2n(1/2−α)2 .
Proof. We apply Lemma A.1 for µ := α and ε := 1/2− α.
